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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 870096 
v. : 
DANNY LEE JOHNSON, ; Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of attempted criminal 
homicide—murder in the first degree, a first degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(k) (Supp. 1986), and of 
being an habitual criminal, a first degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1978), following a trial in Third 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
Raymond Uno, Judge, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction in 
this appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-3(h) (1987) and Utah Code 
Ann. S 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support 
defendant's conviction for attempted first degree murder. 
2. Whether defendant's prior convictions for theft by 
deception and theft were properly admitted under Utah R. Evid. 
609 for purposes of impeachment. 
3. Whether Trooper Bringhurst's Utah Highway Patrol 
uniform was relevant to the issues presented in the case and 
whether the probative value of the uniform outweighed any 
prejudicial effect. 
4. Whether the testimony of Jean Hickam concerning her 
telephone conversation with defendant on May 26, just hours 
before defendant shot the trooper, was relevant to the issues 
presented in the case. 
5. Whether Officer Vern Olsen's statement that he was 
on guard duty at the hospital four days after the shooting was so 
prejudicial that defendant is entitled to a new trial. 
6. Whether the trial court should have formally 
declared Lt. Fallows a hostile witness and should have allowed 
defense counsel to ask leading questions during the entirety of 
her direct examination, and whether defendant was prejudiced as a 
result of the trial court's ruling. 
7. Whether following an attack on Trooper Bringhurst's 
credibility as a witness, the trial court properly allowed 
evidence of his truthfulness. 
8. Whether questions asked by two jurors during the 
course of the trial in open court constituted "early 
deliberation" and, if so, whether defendant was denied due 
process thereby. 
9. Whether the trial court properly denied defense 
counsel's motion to withdraw or for mistrial in order to allow 
her to testify to allegedly inconsistent—although 
insignificant—statements made to her by Det. Imig. 
10. Whether there was "cumulative error" upon which 
this Court should reverse defendant's conviction. 
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11. Whether defendant can be convicted of being an 
habitual criminal when the foundational crime upon which it is 
based is attempted first degree murder. 
12. Whether the documents admitted during the habitual 
criminal trial, which state that defendant was represented by 
counsel during his previous guilty pleas, were sufficient to 
establish a presumption that the pleas were voluntary, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary. 
13. Whether defendant's prior convictions were 
sufficient that he had been "twice convicted" of felony offenses 
and that one of those was at least a felony of the second degree. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Danny Lee Johnson, was convicted by a jury 
of one count of attempted criminal homicide—murder in the first 
degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(k) (Supp. 
1986); he was then convicted following a bench trial of being an 
habitual criminal in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 
(1978). After defendant was convicted on the above counts, the 
prosecution moved to dismiss the charge of possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person (Count II of the 
information). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 27, 1986, Trooper Dennis Bringhurst, the victim 
of the attempted murder in this case, was on duty, dressed in his 
Utah Highway Patrol uniform and driving a clearly marked patrol 
car (R. 1395-99). His shift began on May 26 at 10 p.m. and was, 
at the outset, routine and uneventful (R. 1396, 1400-01). At 
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about 1:00 a.m., he was driving north on the Interstate 15 
"collector" (the 21st-13th-9th South access system) at 17th South 
when he observed defendant's older model Ford (R. 1402, 1405). 
As defendant approached the 13th South off-ramp, he suddenly 
veered from his position in the right lane, across the left lane, 
and through the gore area of the roadway, in order to get to the 
13th South off-ramp (R. 1403). Trooper Bringhurst followed 
defendant down the 13th South off-ramp and when defendant got to 
the semaphore at 13th South, he stopped his car (R. 1406). 
Trooper Bringhurst pulled alongside defendant's car to the left 
(R. 1406). Defendant sat through a full light cycle (red, green, 
yellow, and red) before he finally made his right turn onto 13th 
South to go east (R. 1407). At trial, defendant attempted to 
explain his unusual behavior by claiming that since he was 
driving under the influence, he was waiting for the trooper to 
decide whether he was going to stop him (R. 949-50). 
Defendant proceeded east on 13th South to 3rd West, 
where drove into the left turn lane and again stopped at a red 
light (R. 1408). Trooper Bringhurst pulled up along the right 
.side of defendant's car (R. 1409). Defendant's window was down, 
and Trooper Bringhurst looked over at defendant and asked whether 
he had been drinking (R. 1409). Trooper Bringhurst could not 
discern defendant's response (R. 1409); defendant testified at 
trial that he had answered, MyesM (R. 950). Trooper Bringhurst 
directed defendant to make his turn and pull over (R. 1409). 
Defendant turned left onto 3rd West and began to pull off to the 
side of the road, but changed his mind (R. 1411). Third West is 
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a highly travelled thoroughfare (R. 1053). He drove north until 
he reached Paxton Avenue (1180 South), a quiet side street (R. 
1417, 1053). Although the area was well-lit by street lights, 
the street was still quite dark (R. 1417, 1053). Defendant 
stopped his car while still in the lane of travel (R. 1415). 
Trooper Bringhurst pulled behind defendant in an offset 
position used routinely for traffic stops (R. 1415). With his 
emergency lights flashing, his uniform plainly in view, and his 
flashlight in his hand, Trooper Bringhurst nonchalantly 
approached defendant's car window (R. 1414, 1423, 1425). 
As he approached the window, Trooper Bringhurst stated, 
"Did you say you have been drinking?" (R. 1426.) Defendant 
reached to his right, raised a sawed-off shotgun across his lap, 
and, with a grin on his face, he stated, "It doesn't make any 
difference, does it?" (R. 1426). He fired point blank at the 
officer (R. 1427-28, 1435). 
Upon seeing the gun appear from the dark seat, Trooper 
Bringhurst immediately threw himself backward, with his feet 
still planted on the ground (R. 1427, 1432). He heard the 
shotgun blast and saw a very bright light (R. 1427-28). Although 
he felt nothing at the time, he had been hit on the right side of 
his face with some of the pellets fired from the round (R. 1428, 
1437). 
As Trooper Bringhurst threw himself backward, he 
reached for his sidearm, which caused his head to move slightly 
to the left (R. 1432). Had he not moved, he would have been hit 
directly in the chest area with the blast (R. 1432). Instead he 
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was hit on the right side of his head (R. 1437). He fired in 
return; as he put it, it was almost like his body had been given 
a command (R. 1429, 753-54, Defense exhibit 70). When Trooper 
Bringhurst was hit, he initially did not feel anything; he does 
not remember hitting the ground (R. 1428). He heard all five 
shots he fired (R. 1429, 1433). He was not able to see as he 
fired his first four shots (R. 1429). The only time he could see 
was during his fifth and final shot, and then he was able to 
observe only defendant's profile as he fired (R. 1429-30). 
Trooper Bringhurst did not fire his 6th and last round from his 
service revolver (R. 1091, 1439). Two of the shots fired struck 
defendant; one grazed his cheek and the other struck him in the 
left flank (R. 944-45). 
Officer Ralph Evans, Salt Lake City Police Department, 
was nearby when he heard gunfire (R. 1218). Officer Evans had 
travelled west on 13th South and had turned to go north on 3rd 
West when he heard the shots (R. 1218). He immediately drove 
toward the very loud sound of the shots (R. 1219, 1221). As he 
drove past Paxton Avenue, he looked to his right and saw two cars 
on the road; one was a patrol car with its emergency lights 
activated (R. 1219). He stopped, backed up, and turned onto 
Paxton Avenue (R. 1220). He saw an officer, not at that time 
recognizing which police agency he represented, standing near 
defendant's car firing rounds (R. 1220). Officer Evans heard all 
six shots fired (defendant's shotgun blast and the trooper's five 
shots); he actually saw only the last three shots fired (R. 
1220). He observed the trooper standing and falling to the 
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ground in one continuous motion as he fired the last three shots 
(R. 1221, 1254). Officer Evans was unable to distinguish the 
types of weapon from which the shots were fired, but stated there 
was a brief lapse between the first gunshot and the subsequent 
five shots (R. 1222). 
Officer Evans could not recall whether defendant's car 
door was open or closed (R. 1223). He initially could not see 
anyone in defendant's vehicle, but then saw defendant raise up 
into the drivers seat and speed off (R. 1223). By the time 
Officer Evans got to the vehicles, Trooper Bringhurst had 
returned to his car and was using his police radio (R. 1223-24). 
Trooper Bringhurst motioned him on, and Officer Evans pursued 
defendant as he drove eastbound (R. 1224) At the end of the 
street, defendant made a wide left turn after crossing railroad 
tracks on an embankment in the road (R. 1225). He lost control 
of his car, and crashed into a fence (R. 1225). Officer Evans 
stopped behind him and observed defendant exit the passenger side 
of the car (R. 1229). Officer Evans drew his shotgun and ordered 
defendant to stop (R. 1229). Defendant turned around twice, as 
if looking for a place to run, and then fled (R. 1229). Officer 
Evans returned his shotgun to his car and pursued defendant as he 
ran down a dark alley (R. 1230-31). He twice drew his service 
revolver and ordered defendant to stop, but he did not (R. 1231). 
Defendant ran through a backyard of a residence and attempted to 
climb a chain link fence (R. 1231). Officer Evans was then able 
to apprehend him (R. 1232). Defendant struggled with the officer 
and had to be forcibly subdued and handcuffed (R. 1233). During 
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the struggle, defendant repeatedly told Officer Evans that he 
had the wrong man, and that Kelly Gardner (who was wanted for 
escape) was the one who had shot the trooper (R. 1243, 1047). 
Officer Fowler arrived to assist Officer Evans, and they took 
defendant back to the scene (R. 1242). Defendant was taken by 
ambulance to the hospital for treatment of his wounds (R. 1242). 
Sgt. George Vaughn, a 15-year veteran police officer 
with Salt Lake City Police Department, was a short distance away 
from the location of the shooting (R. 1288). He was standing 
outside his car at the city gas pumps located at 8th South and 
3rd West when he heard the shots (R. 1289). There was no noise 
at the time to interfere with his ability to hear (R. 1294). 
Sgt. Vaughn testified that he heard the distinct sound of a 
shotgun blast; the blast was then followed by five or six shots 
from a revolver (R. 1289). He recognized the initial gunshot as 
a shotgun blast immediately upon hearing it (R. 1289). He 
described the shotgun blast as a "kaboom," which was followed by 
the sharper sounds of a revolver (R. 1290). He was able to 
discern the direction from which the shots came, and immediately 
went to the area (R. 1291). He observed Trooper Bringhurst 
sitting in his patrol car and immediately requested medical 
assistance (R. 1291). 
Two weapons were found in defendant's car; a sawed off 
shotgun, which he had used to shoot Trooper Bringhurst, and a 
loaded .25 automatic handgun (R. 1316, 1322-23). Even though no 
one had seen a second person in defendant's car, based on 
defendant's claim that Kelly Gardner, and not he, had shot the 
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trooper, numerous officers arrived at the scene and an extensive 
search was carried out to rule out the possibility that someone 
else was involved (R. 1300-01). 
Defendant was struck by two bullets; one grazed his 
left cheek, the other struck him in the lower left back (R. 944-
45). There were three wounds in close proximity on his back; Dr. 
Noyes could not tell whether they were entrance or exit wounds 
(R. 944-45). Trooper Bringhurst could not see because of the 
bright light from the shotgun blast so he did not know whether 
the door was open or closed (R. 1428-29, 1435); however, it was 
obvious that the car door was open during at least part of the 
shots (R. 1325). One bullet struck the kick panel in the lower 
portion of the driver's door frame (R. 1325) Two struck the back 
rest of the drivers seat (R. 1326-27), with one of those going 
through the passenger seat back rest and into the passenger door 
(R. 1327-29). These three bullets would have necessarily been 
fired while the door was open (R. 1325). One bullet struck the 
passenger door window post near the windshield (R. 1330). 
Trooper Bringhurst was taken to LDS Hospital, where he 
spent the next four days (R. 1441-42). He had surgery twice, 
and, at the time of trial, anticipated additional reconstructive 
surgery (R. 1442-43). He suffered hearing loss, and has 
persistent headaches, eye pain, and nightmares (R. 1443). Dr. 
Allred testified that if the shotgun blast had been one-fourth to 
one-half an inch to the left, the pellets would have entered the 
orbit of his eye, caused extensive injury, and would have in all 
probability resulted in death (R. 1187, 1190-91). 
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Prior to the incident, defendant was upset and angry 
(783-89). His girlfriend, Missy, had been dating someone else 
whose name is Michael Poulton (R. 783). Earlier that evening, 
defendant had called his girlfriend's apartment; Jean Hickam 
answered the phone (R. 774, 776). Ms. Hickam was previously 
defendant's brother's fiance, and recognized defendant's voice on 
the telephone (R. 1023, 774, 782). The conversation lasted for 
30-45 minutes (R. 782). During the conversation, defendant made 
threatening statements directed at Michael Poulton, including 
that he was going to beat him up, tear his legs off, and had 
explosives and might blow up the apartment building (R. 782-85). 
Ms. Hickam could hear guns clicking in the background as 
defendant made comments about loading and unloading the guns (R. 
786). 
Ms. Hickam was extremely reluctant to testify for the 
prosecution at trial. After the phone call from defendant, Ms. 
Hickam had called the sheriff's office (R. 787). Deputy Willden 
(and several other deputies) responded and he completed a report 
(R. 795, 802-03). Ms. Hickam attempted to neutralize her 
previous statements and testified that she may have been 
inaccurate in her statement to Deputy Willden made only a short 
time after the incident (R. 790-799). Nevertheless, Ms. Hickam 
was sufficiently concerned by defendant's statements, that she 
wanted to leave and the officers escorted her and the others from 
the apartment (R. 787) Deputy Willden testified that he felt 
very threatened while walking from the apartment (R. 809). 
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Ms. Hickam told Deputy Willden that defendant had said 
if the police were notified, he had a long rifle with a scope and 
plenty of ammunition (R. 805-06). She told him that defendant 
claimed to have a sawed-off shotgun and a .357 magnum (R. 806), 
She also told Deputy Willden that defendant had a contract out on 
Poulton, and that he was going to tear his legs off and blow his 
head off, and referred to Poulton as "dead" (R. 804-05). 
Defendant's version of the shooting was basically the 
same as Trooper Bringhurst's with respect to the events while 
driving to Paxton Avenue (R. 949-51). Defendant stated that he 
sat at the light at the 13th South off-ramp because, since he was 
driving under the influence, he knew the trooper was interested 
in him so he waited to see whether he was going to be pulled over 
(R. 949-50). He stated that he had eye contact with the trooper 
and smiled at him (R. 949). He remembered what had occurred at 
the semaphore at 3rd West and 13th South, and stated that when he 
was asked if he had been drinking, he had replied, "yes" (R. 950-
51) 
Defendant stated that after he stopped on Paxton 
Avenue, Trooper Bringhurst approached his car as he asked if he 
had been drinking (R. 954). Defendant stated that his response 
was probably affirmative (R. 954). He stated that he turned and 
smiled at the trooper, and told him that he was going to hand a 
gun out the window (R. 954). He grabbed the shotgun and started 
to hand it out (R. 955). The trooper, according to defendant, 
immediately went into a crouched position and reached for his gun 
(R. 956). Defendant claimed that he let go of the shotgun and 
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turned to get out of the car as he asked what was going on (R. 
957). He opened the door and got his left leg out of the car (R. 
958). As he was turning he slipped on some unknown object (R. 
958). He then saw the trooper fire his gun (R. 958). He claimed 
that the first shot hit him in the cheek and that the second hit 
him in the back (R. 958-59. This was inconsistent with what he 
had told Officer Vern Olson while at the hospital a few days 
after the event; he told the officer that he was not hit until 
the third shot (R. 1078). 
Defendant claimed that he was unable to recall picking 
up the gun or shooting the trooper (R. 960). He then got back 
into the car, turned on the ignition and drove off (R. 961). He 
claimed to have no memory of driving up the road, crossing the 
railroad tracks, or getting out of the car (R. 962-63). He said 
he did not recall the police officer chasing him, but remembers 
only that he attempted to climb the fence (R. 963). Defendant's 
claim at trial was that Trooper Bringhurst show him first and 
that somehow, in self-defense, he shot the trooper (R. 692). 
Oscar Hendrickson, a retired police officer, armorer 
and expert on firearms, testified that he had examined 
defendant's Stevens 12 gauge sawed-off shotgun, and found it to 
be in good working order (R. 1098-1101, 1107). Both the barrel 
and the stock had been sawed off, and a thong had been placed on 
the stock in order to compensate for the shortened stock (R. 
1102, 1104). He testified that it would take a considerable 
amount of energy (eleven to fourteen pounds of pull) in order to 
operate the weapon (R. 1105). The single action gun would have 
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to be loaded and cocked prior to firing (R. 1103). The gun 
contains a half-cock position, which would prevent accidental 
discharge if one's finger slipped from the hammer while cocking 
the gun (R. 1108). Mr. Hendrickson testified that the gun would 
have a considerable amount of recoil and would "jump 
considerably" when fired (R. 1104). Sgt. Richard Bergan actually 
test fired the gun and found it to have a substantial concussion 
and recoil upon discharge (R. 1133). 
Defendant explained his possession of the two loaded 
firearms by informing the jury about his prior dealings with 
Detective Curt Imig at West Valley Police Department (R. 952-53). 
Defendant stated that three years earlier he and Imig had entered 
an agreement that if defendant were to ever come across any 
illegal weapons, he should "acquire those weapons for him and 
show them to him" (R. 953). Defendant stated that he had 
obtained the weapons at a party earlier that evening from a 
friend who gave them to him voluntarily and without compensation 
(R. 953, 982). Defendant refused to disclose the name of the 
person from whom he obtained the weapons (R. 980). 
In rebuttal, Detective Imig testified that he had first 
met defendant in 1982 and that defendant had previously provided 
the West Valley police (Det. Imig and others) with information 
about narcotics and stolen property (R. 838-39). Defendant had 
been specifically instructed that all transactions were to be 
conducted in accordance with department guidelines, had to be 
"controlled" (set up, tape recorded, or video taped), and 
required prior approval by the city attorney (R. 843-44). In no 
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previous transaction had defendant obtained stolen property or 
narcotics on his own and turned them over to the police (R. 844). 
The department had decided, following an incident with defendant, 
to discontinue the relationship with him in 1986; defendant was 
not informed of the decision (R. 841). Detective Imig had last 
spoken to defendant in 1985 (R. 841). 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the charge of 
attempted criminal homicide—murder in the first degree (R. 145). 
The defendant waived the jury with respect to the finding 
required to* invoke the firearm enhancement; the court made the 
requisite finding that a firearm was used during the commission 
of the crime (R. 725). 
The habitual criminal charge was tried to the bench (R. 
615). Ralph Newberg, Records Administrator for the Idaho 
Department of Corrections, identified the defendant and provided 
foundation for the admission of prison documents (R. 617-18). 
Defendant was initially committed to the Idaho prison for first 
degree burglary, a felony which carried of term of imprisonment 
of not less than one nor more than five years (R. 620). He was 
subsequently committed for the crime of escape, which carried a 
term of imprisonment of an indeterminate term not to exceed two 
years (R. 621). He was again convicted and committed for escape 
and also for assault with a deadly weapon (R. 622). The escape 
conviction resulted in a term of imprisonment of not to exceed 
five years, and the assault conviction resulted in a consecutive 
term of imprisonment not to exceed two years (R. 622-23). 
Defendant was discharged from the prison on August 21, 1980 (R. 
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623). A certified copy of the judgments for each of the 
convictions were admitted (R. 634, Exhibit 1 (See Appendix B)). 
Each judgment reflects that defendant was represented by counsel 
(Appendix B). The court found defendant guilty of being an 
habitual criminal (R. 646). The prosecution moved to dismiss 
Count II, possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person 
(R. 649, 611). 
Defendant was sentenced on Count I, attempted criminal 
homicide—murder in the first degree, to five years to life with 
an additional one to five years for the use of a firearm during 
the commission of the crime. The sentence was ordered enhanced 
for the habitual criminal conviction, with no specified 
additional term of imprisonment. The court recommended to the 
Board of Pardons that defendant serve not less than 25 years in 
the Utah State Prison. (R. 452-55.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented was sufficient to establish that 
defendant acted knowingly and intentionally when he fired his 
sawed-off shotgun point blank at Trooper Bringhurst. The 
evidence, particularly when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict, established that defendant intended to kill 
Trooper Bringhurst. Only the trooper's evasive action saved him 
from almost certain death. After defendant was pulled over for 
being suspected of driving under the influence, the trooper 
approached his car and asked if he had been drinking. Defendant 
raised his shotgun across his lap, stated, "It doesn't make any 
difference, does it,M and fired directly at Trooper Bringhurst. 
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A police officer standing outside a few blocks away heard the 
shots and knew that the first shot was a shotgun blast followed 
by the sharper cracking sounds of a revolver. Defendant was 
upset and angry that night and had threatened to harm anyone 
including police officers if they got in his way of harming 
Michael Poulton, a man who was dating defendant's girlfriend. 
Although defendant had been drinking and had consumed 
sufficient alcohol that his blood alcohol content was .20 percent 
at 2 a.m., his conduct and the observations made by others who 
observed him established that he was not so intoxicated that he 
could not form the intent to commit the crime. 
Defendant was previously convicted of, among other 
crimes, theft by deception and theft. These convictions were 
properly admitted pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 609 because they 
involve dishonesty or false statement. 
Defendant's intent was the central issue for the jury 
to decide. One of the elements of the crime was that the victim, 
Trooper Bringhurst, was a law enforcement officer. Therefore, 
the trooper's uniform, which had dried blood stains on one 
shoulder and was not unduly gruesome, was relevant and its 
probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. 
On May 26, only hours before defendant shot Trooper 
Bringhurst, defendant had a telephone conversation with Jean 
Hickam. Defendant was upset and angry during the conversation 
and directed specific threats to one Michael Poulton. He also 
stated that he had guns and that he would harm anyone, including 
police officers, who stood in his way of carrying out his 
-16-
threats. Ms. Hickam's testimony was relevant to defendant's 
intent, the main disputed issue in this case. The prejudicial 
effect of the testimony was outweighed by its significant 
probative value. 
Officer Vern Olsen testified at trial regarding 
statements made by defendant four days after the shooting while 
the officer was at the hospital on guard duty; that the jury knew 
Olsen was on "guard duty" was not prejudicial and defendant is 
not entitled to a new trial. 
Lt. Dan Fallows was called as a defense witness. He 
was questioned by both counsel outside the presence of the jury 
prior to his actual testimony and, while he had feelings about 
the case, did not manifest that he was a "hostile" witness. 
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to allow defense counsel to proceed during the entirety 
of the direct examination by leading questions. During the 
significant portion of Lt. Fallow's testimony (after background 
information was elicited), defense counsel used leading 
questions. Defendant must show that he was actually prejudiced 
by the trial court's ruling; he has not made such a claim, much 
less a showing of prejudice. 
The focus of the defense was to bring out inconsistent 
statements, however minor, made by Trooper Bringhurst during his 
many previous statements concerning the events surrounding the 
shooting. While these statements viewed separately were 
insignificant, their cumulative effect was an attack on the 
credibility of Trooper Bringhurst as a witness. Because his 
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credibility had been attacked, evidence of Trooper Bringhurst's 
reputation for truthfulness was properly admitted. 
During the course of the trial in open court, two 
jurors asked questions of the trial court. Taken in context, the 
first juror's question evidenced that he wanted to know whether 
he would be required to remember all the details of the evidence 
presented at trial. The court explained that the attorneys would 
attempt to piece together the evidence during closing arguments 
and that the jury would use its collective memory during 
deliberation. The question by the second juror was not answered 
and the jury as a whole was instructed that any questions during 
the course of the trial should be made in writing. This series 
of events did not constitute "early deliberation" and deny 
defendant a fair trial. 
The prosecution called Det. Imig to rebut certain 
statements made by defendant concerning the reason he was in 
possession of the sawed-off shotgun and .25 automatic on the 
night he shot Trooper Bringhurst. During cross-examination, Det. 
Imig allegedly made statements that were inconsistent with his 
statements during an earlier telephone conversation with defense 
counsel. Only defense counsel and Det. Imig were parties to the 
conversation. After the conclusion of the evidence, defense 
counsel moved to withdraw as counsel or for mistrial so she could 
testify regarding her conversation with Det. Imig. The alleged 
impeachment material was insignificant and related to collateral 
matters. The trial court properly denied defendant's motion. 
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Defendant was properly convicted of being an habitual 
criminal following his conviction for the triggering offense, 
attempted first degree murder. The language of the statute is 
clear and unambiguous and does not preclude an attempt to commit 
first or second degree murder from being the triggering offense. 
Evidence that defendant had previously been "twice 
convicted" was admitted in the form of testimony from the 
custodian of records for the Idaho Department of Corrections and 
the judgments of defendant's prior convictions. The judgments 
reflect that during each of defendant's prior guilty pleas, he 
was represented by counsel. Consequently, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, the prior pleas are presumed to have 
been voluntary. Defendant presented no evidence that his pleas 
were not voluntary. 
Defendant's prior convictions include convictions in 
Idaho for "burglary in the first degree," escape, a second 
escape, and assault with a deadly weapon. The prior crimes were 
sufficient to establish that defendant had been "twice convicted" 
of felony offenses, one of which was at least a felony of the 
second degree. Thus, the evidence supports defendant's 
conviction for being an habitual criminal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT DEFENDANT'S GUILT OF ATTEMPTED FIRST 
DEGREE MURDER. 
The evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for 
attempted criminal homicide—murder in the first degree. To 
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convict a defendant of attempted murder, the State must produce 
evidence that would allow the jury to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that defendant intentionally or knowingly attempted to 
cause Trooper Bringhurst's death. State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502 
(Utah 1986). In Dumas, this Court stated that M[i]ntent is an 
element that often can be proved only by means of circumstantial 
evidence." ^d. at 504 (footnote omitted). 
In the present case, the State produced more than 
sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that defendant intentionally or knowingly attempted to 
cause Trooper Bringhurst's death. In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983), this Court stated: 
We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when evidence, so 
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. 
In the present case, the evidence, when viewed as a 
whole, overwhelmingly supports the jury's verdict and the verdict 
should not be reversed based on insufficiency grounds. 
A. The Evidence of Intent to Cause Trooper 
Bringhurst's Death is Sufficient. 
Defendant's theory of the case was that Trooper 
Bringhurst shot first and that he, in an effort to save his life, 
returned fire (R. 692). However, when the totality of the 
evidence is examined and viewed in its proper context, it becomes 
compelling that defendant's version of the incident is inherently 
improbable. The jury obviously chose to disregard a number of 
his statements and in convicting defendant as charged, found that 
the evidence simply did not support his version of the incident. 
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Trooper Bringhurst first observed defendant as they 
both drove northbound on the 1-15 collector near 21st South (R. 
1402). He observed defendant drive in an unusual manner when he 
changed lanes and drove through the gore area in order to get to 
the 13th South off-ramp (R. 1403). Defendant then stopped at the 
semaphore at the bottom of the ramp (R. 1406). He sat through 
the light cycle, again exhibiting unusual driving behavior (R. 
1407). At that point, it appears that defendant was almost 
inviting the patrolman to stop him. He then drove to the traffic 
light at 3rd West and 13th South and stopped in the left turn 
lane (R. 1408). When Trooper Bringhurst pulled up alongside him 
and asked him if he had been drinking, he replied "yes" (R. 950-
51, 1409) Again, it appears that defendant was inviting the 
trooper to make a traffic stop. 
Defendant then drove along 3rd West and almost pulled 
over but then continued on (R. 1411). He testified at trial that 
he turned onto Paxton Avenue because he was concerned about 
leaving his belongings in his car and that the area would be more 
secure (R. 951). However, 3rd West is well lighted and a major 
thoroughfare (R. 951, 1053); it would be less likely that his car 
would be burglarized on 3rd West than on a secluded side street. 
Defendant stated that he expected to be arrested; however, he did 
not pull his car off the road, but rather parked in the lane of 
travel (R. 1415). Although there are street lights on Paxton 
Avenue, the street is a quiet side street and would provide a 
more private area in which to shoot the officer (R. 1417, 1053). 
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Trooper Bringhurst parked his patrol car in an offset, 
traffic stop position and walked toward defendant's car (R. 
1415). As he approached, he asked defendant if he had said he 
had been drinking (R. 1426). Defendant looked at the trooper 
with a smile on his face, raised the sawed-off shotgun over his 
lap, and, as he said "It doesn't make any difference, does it," 
he fired point blank (R. 1426-428, 1435). 
Trooper Bringhurst unequivocably testified at the 
preliminary hearing and at trial (and in multiple statements to 
the investigating officers and the Shooting Review Board) that he 
immediately threw himself backward in an effort to avoid the 
gunfire (R. 1407, 1427, 1432, 486-87). His feet were planted on 
the ground, and he simply threw his body backward. As he threw 
himself backward, he reached for his gun (R. 1432). He saw the 
bright light and heard the explosion of the shotgun blast (R. 
1427-28). He clearly and distinctly remembers this sequence of 
events. 
Trooper Bringhurst was not totally conscious of the 
events that occurred in the next few seconds. He clearly 
remembers hearing the five shots that he fired (R. 1429). He was 
unable to see anything during the first four shots, due to the 
bright light, the trauma to his head, and the blood in his eye 
(R. 1429-30). However, on his fifth shot, he was able to focus 
on defendant and observe his profile as he fired (R. 1429-30). 
Trooper Bringhurst was unable to see whether the door was open or 
closed during this sequence of events (R. 1435). He did not know 
that the door had been opened; however, it was clear from the 
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bullet holes on the car that the door had been open for at least 
three of the five shots. One of the bullets struck the driver's 
door kick panel (R. 1325). Two struck the back rest of the 
drivers seat (they entered on the side) (R. 1326-27). It appears 
that one struck defendant's cheek and then the passenger door 
post near the windshield (R. 1330, 945). It appears that the 
remaining bullet struck defendant's left flank (R. 944-45). 
Defendant's argument that the trooper's testimony is inherently 
improbable because he "recalled that the door was closed 
throughout the incident (Br. of App. at 13), is a misstatement of 
the evidence and is, regardless, without merit. Trooper 
Bringhurst was temporarily blinded by the shotgun blast. He 
could not see anything when he fired his first four shots. He 
had some vision during his last shot. His inability to see did 
not make his testimony "inherently improbable." 
Officer Evans testified that when he first saw Trooper 
Bringhurst, he was on his feet and going to the ground in one 
continuous motion (R. 1221, 1254). During this time, he saw 
Trooper Bringhurst fire three shots (R. 1220). Officer Evans did 
not see Trooper Bringhurst approach the car, he did not see 
defendant fire the shotgun, he did not see defendant open or 
partially exit the door, and he did not see Trooper Bringhurst's 
first two shots. Officer Evans actually saw only the last three 
shots (R. 1220). Trooper Bringhurst does not recall specifically 
what he did between his first and fifth shot; he only remembers 
hearing the five rounds of his firearm being discharged (R. 
1433). It is possible, and consistent with Officer Evans's 
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observations, that after he threw himself backward to avoid the 
blast, Trooper Bringhurst attempted to get to his feet, but 
because he was unsteady, he fell to the ground. Officer Evans 
saw him on his feet as he was falling to the ground in one motion 
(R. 1221, 1224). 
Defendant totally ignores a critical portion of the 
evidence—evidence which supports Trooper Bringhurst's testimony 
and destroys his version of the incident. Sgt. Vaughn testified 
that he heard a shotgun blast followed by five or six reports 
from a revolver (R. 1289). Sgt. Vaughn was standing outside his 
patrol car at the city gas pumps located a few blocks away (R. 
1289). As he heard the first shot, he knew it was a shotgun 
blast; the subsequent reports had a different sound and he could 
tell came from a revolver (R. 1289-90). 
Q. (By the prosecutor): Sgt. Vaughn, would 
you tell the jury how that first blast 
sounded and how it was different from the 
subsequent shots? 
A. The first blast which I believed at that 
time was to be from a shotgun was more like 
a — if your kids would describe [it], they 
would say "kaboom." It's a lower rumbling 
sound. The report from a gun, a revolver, a 
handgun or rifle is a sharp crack much 
shorter in time span. 
(R. 1290.) 
Defendant's version of the incident is inherently 
improbable. He stated that after he had been pulled over, and 
the trooper was approaching his car, he told him that he was 
going to hand a weapon out the window (R. 954). He does not 
remember the officer's response, but he "reached across and 
grabbed the shotgun" to hand it out the window (R. 955). 
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Defendant claims that the trooper jumped back and "went into a 
crouch" (R. 956). He claims he was so startled that he let go of 
the shotgun. He then asked the trooper what was wrong, but 
received no response (R. 957). He then decided to get out of the 
car, despite the fact that the trooper was in a crouched position 
and had reached for his gun. Defendant stated that he opened the 
door and put his left leg out, and as he was raising up he 
slipped on something but did not know what it was (R. 958). He 
claims that Trooper Bringhurst then fired a shot which hit him in 
the right cheek (R. 958-59). Given the fact that Trooper 
Bringhurst was crouched down and had drawn his weapon, it seems 
extremely unlikely that someone in defendant's position would 
attempt to get out of the car. However, defendant had to offer 
an explanation for the door being open, which was obvious as the 
result of the location of the bullet holes. His explanation, 
however, was so improbable that the jury chose to disregard it. 
Defendant remembers with clarity the details to this 
point. However, he does not remember what happened next (R. 
960). Specifically, he claims not to remember having picked up 
the shotgun, cocking it, and firing it at the trooper (R. 960). 
The evidence showed that it would take considerable effort to 
discharge the weapon. The trigger pull is 11 to 14 pounds; as 
Oscar Hendrickson testified, if a 10 pound bag of sugar were hung 
on the trigger, it would not cause the weapon to discharge (R. 
1105). Additionally, Sgt. Bergen test fired the weapon and 
testified about the considerable "kick" or recoil the weapon has 
upon discharge (R. 1133). Because the stock of the weapon had 
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been sawed off, defendant could not brace the stock against his 
shoulder (R. 1102f 1104), A thong had been attached to the stock 
in order to assist in controlling the gun (R. 1104). It would be 
inherently improbable for defendant to remember all events 
leading up to discharging the weapon, but be unable to recall 
actually picking up the gun, cocking it, and firing it. 
Further, defendant's testimony at trial was 
inconsistent with his statements made at the time of his 
apprehension. He told Officer Evans that Kelly Gardner, a man 
wanted for escape, had shot the trooper, not he (R. 1243, 1047). 
However, the physical evidence and the eye-witness testimony did 
not support defendant's claim that a second person was present. 
Defendant specifically told Evans that he did not shoot the 
trooper (R. 1243); if he was in fact unaware that he had shot the 
trooper, as he claimed at trial, he obviously would not proclaim 
his innocence to the specific act of shooting the trooper to the 
first person he saw. 
His testimony at trial was also inconsistent with what 
he had told Officer Olson while at the hospital only four days 
after the event. Defendant told Officer Olson that he had seen 
all five shots and had not been hit until the third shot, 
contrary to his trial testimony that he had been hit on the first 
shot (R. 1078). 
Defendant argues that if he had really wanted to kill 
Trooper Bringhurst, he could have easily done so because the 
trooper had fired all of his bullets and was lying helplessly on 
the ground (Br. of App. 19). However, this is not supported by 
the evidence. Trooper Bringhurst consciously did not fire his 
sixth and final shot (R. 1439). Defendant was likely taken off 
guard when Trooper Bringhurst started firing back; as a result, 
after opening the car door, he retreated into the car, being 
struck twice during this time, and attempted to drive away. The 
.25 automatic was found on the floor under the gas pedal (R. 
1322); perhaps in the confusion and pain, he was unable to locate 
it in order to shoot Trooper Bringhurst again. 
Defendant was angry and upset on the night in question 
(R. 783-89). He had been drinking (R. 944), which would have 
decreased his inhibitions. He had weapons with him at the time 
he spoke to Jean Hickam earlier in the evening, and made 
threatening sounds with the guns by saying something to the 
effect "load" and "unload" as he clicked the mechanisms (R. 786). 
He was in this state of mind when Trooper Bringhurst saw him and 
became concerned that he was possibly driving under the 
influence. It would be expected behavior of one who is driving 
under the influence to do whatever reasonably possible to avoid 
arrest; however, defendant sat through an entire light cycle at 
the bottom of the 13th South off-ramp (R. 1407). He also 
responded affirmatively when asked at the next traffic light 
whether he had been drinking (R. 950). He then picked a quiet, 
secluded side street on which to pull over (R. 1417). Trooper 
Bringhurst approached defendant and asked if he had said he had 
been drinking, and defendant replied, "It doesn't make any 
difference, does it?", as he fired point blank with a sawed off 
shotgun (R. 1426-28, 1435). There can be no question with 
respect to his intent to kill. 
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In State v. Castonquayf 663 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1983), upon 
which defendant relied to support his claim that he lacked the 
intent to commit the crime, this Court held the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain the verdict of attempted first degree 
murder. An assault during which a weapon is used is not 
sufficient to presume that the assault was done with the intent 
to produce death. The particular intent must be proved by either 
direct or circumstantial evidence. This Court acknowledged that 
criminal intent is seldom proved by direct evidence and must 
instead be inferred from the circumstances involved. 
Castonquay is easily distinguished on its facts. 
Defendant was initially approached by two officers (one of whom 
was the alleged victim of the later incident). They spoke and 
parted on friendly terms. A short time later, defendant began to 
apparently indiscriminately fire his rifle. Some of the bullets 
may have come near the officers, but there was no evidence to 
support this. The officer approached the defendant, took cover 
from a distance of over 200 feet, and ordered him to drop his 
gun. The defendant did not respond; he testified that he had not 
heard the command. The officer testified that defendant again 
fired his rifle; however, he did not see the shot being fired 
(although it would have produced a visible muzzle blast) and no 
spent bullet was ever found. The other officer involved, from an 
area near the defendant, ordered defendant to drop the rifle; the 
defendant immediately complied. The present case is easily 
distinguished from Castonquay. Here, inter alia, defendant fired 
point blank at the officer at a distance of about five feet. 
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Prior to the shot, he grinned at the officer as he made a 
sarcastic comment. Part of the pellets from the shell struck 
Trooper Bringhurst on the side of the head. In fact, had Trooper 
Bringhurst not taken evasive action, the blast would have, with 
near certainty, resulted in his death. 
In Thacker v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 767, 114 S.E. 504 
(1922), cited in Castonguay, the court held that the evidence of 
attempted murder was insufficient. The defendant attempting to 
shoot a light out, fired three shots, two of which went through a 
tent in which a family was camping; one bullet passed through the 
head of the bed in which someone was sleeping. The evidence was 
found not to be sufficient to sustain a verdict of attempted 
murder. 
The evidence in this case was more than sufficient to 
establish defendant's intent to commit murder. Because the 
evidence, and the inferences drawn from it, establish defendant's 
intent, this Court should sustain defendant's conviction for 
attempted first degree murder. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 345 
(Utah 1985). 
B. Defendant's Level of Intoxication Did Not Negate 
His Intent to Commit the Crime. 
Defendant contends that his intoxicated condition 
prevented him from forming the requisite intent necessary for the 
commission of attempted criminal homicide. Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-306 (1978) provides in pertinent part that •'[vjoluntary 
intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge unless 
such intoxication negates the existence of the mental state which 
is an element of the offense ....•• 
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Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree 
murder in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202(k) (Supp. 1986). 
Although criminal homicide covers various mental states, the 
requisite mental state for the commission of the crime in this 
case was that defendant committed the specified acts knowingly or 
intentionally. 
A person acts intentionally when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or to cause the 
result; a person acts knowingly when he is aware that his conduct 
is reasonably certain to cause the result. See Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-2-103(1) and (2) (1978). In State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 
1223 (Utah 1983), this Court stated with reference to proof of 
intent that "intent need not be proved by direct evidence. It 
may be inferred from the actions of the defendant or from 
surrounding circumstances" (footnotes omitted). 
Although defendant did not argue to the jury during 
closing argument the defense of voluntary intoxication (R. 676-
702), evidence was adduced at trial with respect to his 
consumption of alcohol and blood alcohol level at the time he was 
hospitalized (R. 944-45). The jury was instructed on this 
defense in instruction No. 26 (R. 172).1 Despite his failure to 
Instruction No. 26 states: 
Under the law, a state of voluntary 
intoxication from alcohol or drugs is not a 
defense to a criminal charge unless such 
intoxication is of such degree or state as to 
negate the existence of the mntal state which 
is an element of the offense. 
Evidence of intoxication may thus be taken 
into consideration by the jury in connection 
actively pursue this potential defense at trial, defendant now 
requests this Court to overturn his conviction because he 
allegedly did not have the requisite mental intent. The jury 
chose not to acquit based upon his voluntary intoxication; the 
jury found the requisite intent—that he acted knowingly and 
intentionally when he shot the trooper—because they found, in 
convicting the defendant as charged, all of the elements of 
attempted first degree murder. 
The most reliable evidence of defendant's intoxication 
was the blood alcohol test result. Defendant introduced 
evidence, by way of stipulation, that his blood alcohol level at 
2:00 a.m. was .20 percent (R. 945). Defendant testified that he 
had consumed "a liter and a fifth" of whiskey prior to the time 
2 
he left a party at 1:00 a.m. (R. 947). Officer Evans testified 
that he observed no evidence of intoxication; Officer Fowler 
Cont. Cont. with determiing the intent 
with which any particular act may have been 
committed. 
Being under the influence of alcohol or drugs 
is no excuse for the commission of a crime 
where it merely makes a person more excited 
or reckless, so that one does things one 
might not otherwise have done. To be a 
defense to such a crime, one must be so under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs that at the 
time of the alleged offense, he was then and 
there incapable of acting intentionally or 
knowingly. 
If from the evidence you have a reasonable 
doubt whether the defendant was capable of 
acting intentionally or knowingly, then you 
must find the defendant not guilty. 
2 
Defendant's testimony regarding his consumption was obviously 
exaggerated and is contrary to the blood test result. A liter 
and a fifth of alcohol would constitute 59.2 ounces. 
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testified that he observed a strong odor of alcohol. While there 
was some conflict and discrepancy about whether defendant showed 
signs of intoxication and to what degree, this was a question for 
the jury to resolve. In State v. McCullar# 674 P.2d 117, 118 
(Utah 1983) this Court stated that " [jJudging the credibility of 
the witnesses and weight of the evidence is exclusively the 
prerogative of the jury." 
Defendant's actions are the second best indicator of 
his level of intoxication. His driving pattern, while certainly 
reckless, was not so egregious as to establish intoxication 
sufficient to negate his intent. When defendant stopped at the 
first traffic light, by his own admission, he was sufficiently 
aware of the surrounding circumstances to know that the trooper 
was "interested" in him. He was able to understand and reply to 
Trooper Bringhurst's question regarding whether he had been 
drinking. Defendant was able to recall these details after the 
event. 
Defendant's actions after the shooting also show that 
he was not sufficiently intoxicated so as to negate the intent 
element of attempted murder. Defendant immediately fled in his 
car after the shooting (R. 1223). After he lost control of the 
car, probably due to excessive speed, the raised railroad tracks 
and the turn in the road, he exited the passenger door, turned 
around twice as if looking for a place to run, and fled on foot 
down a dark alley (R. 1230-31 )• Despite the fact that Officer 
Evans was neither injured nor had consumed alcohol, he was not 
able to apprehend him during the chase until defendant reached a 
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chain link fence that he could not climb (R. 1229-30). Defendant 
attempted to get away by struggling with Officer Evans, and the 
officer had to forcibly subdue him (R. 1233). These actions are 
not consistent with the behavior of someone who is so under the 
influence that he would be unable to intentionally or knowingly 
engage in conduct. 
Defendant was sufficiently cognizant that he was able 
to think up a defense to his crime immediately upon his 
apprehension. He told Officer Evans that he had caught the wrong 
man, that he didn't shoot the trooper, and that someone else—a 
person wanted by the police—had done the shooting (R. 1243, 
1047). He obviously knew he was in serious trouble and was 
sufficiently mindful to immediately begin efforts to avoid the 
consequences. Again these actions are not consistent with his 
being under the influence of alcohol to the degree that he could 
not form the requisite intent for attempted murder. 
In State v. Lenzinq, 688 P.2d 492 (Utah 1984), 
defendant was convicted of attempted homicide, aggravated 
robbery, and carrying a concealed weapon. The defendant and the 
victim were residents of a hobo camp. They had both been 
drinking on the evening of the incident. After a short 
conversation, the defendant stabbed the victim in the back, chest 
and stomach. Defendant then stole the victim's watch and 
backpack. An experience officer testified at trial that the 
defendant had been drinking but was not intoxicated. This Court 
stated: 
While the evidence on the degree of 
intoxication was conflicting, there was 
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evidence which, if believed by the jury, was 
sufficient to find that appellant was not 
incapable of forming the requisite intent. 
We certainly cannot hold as a matter of law 
as the appellant would have us do, that the 
evidence of his intoxication was so 
persuasive as to negate the required intent 
for attempted criminal homicide. 
Id. at 493. 
The present case is similar to the case of State v. 
Bush, 646 P.2d 748 (Utah 1982), in which the defendant, while 
under the influence of alcohol, kidnapped several people, stole 
two cars, shot at one of the passengers in the car he was 
driving, and engaged in a high speed chase with police before 
crashing and being apprehended. Two of those kidnapped testified 
that during the ordeal the defendant spoke coherently and 
followed directions without difficulty, despite referring to 
himself as a drunk-crazed murderer. The judge in Bush returned a 
verdict of guilty of aggravated kidnapping, attempted homicide, 
and aggravated robbery. 
This Court noted that while Bush may have been 
intoxicated, the evidence of his ability to communicate and make 
decisions was sufficient for the trial court to conclude that he 
was capable of forming the requisite intent for the crimes with 
which he was charged. Therefore, the verdict of the fact finder 
was affirmed. See also State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah 
1981). 
On the facts presented in the instant case, the jury, 
as trier of fact, could reasonably conclude appellant's 
intoxication did not negate his intent. Although appellant had 
been drinking and his blood alcohol content was .20 percent, he 
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was coherent and could understand what was going on around him, 
make decisions, and even formulate a defense to his crime. 
In State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), the 
defendant claimed that he was so intoxicated that he could not 
form the requisite intent to commit murder. This Court held that 
the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on voluntary 
intoxication. Although there was evidence that the defendant had 
been drinking, there was no evidence that he was so intoxicated 
at the time of the crime that he was unable to form the intent 
necessary to prove robbery. 
This Court said in Wood, 648 P.2d at 90, that in order 
for the defendant to successfully use the defense of 
intoxication, it would have been necessary to show that his mind 
had been affected to such an extent that he did not have the 
capacity to form the requisite intent. In the present case, 
defendant has not shown that there was such a significant impact 
on his capacity to reason that he could not knowingly or 
intentionally commit the crime. Defendant presented only his 
self-serving statements and the blood alcohol analysis pursuant 
to stipulation to establish his intoxication. He presented no 
expert testimony on this issue, and did not even argue the 
defense during closing argument. Whether defendant's 
intoxication was so significant that he did not have the 
requisite intent to commit the crime is a question for the jury 
to determine. State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah 1981). The 
evidence with respect to defendant's intent commit the crime and 
his intoxication was not so inherently improbable or inconclusive 
to justify this Court disregarding the determination made by the 
trier of fact. Defendant's argument in this regard is without 
merit. 
As this Court stated in State v. Underwood, 737 P.2d 
995 (Utah 1987 )# when reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of 
the evidence, the court will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the jury. "It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses." Ici. at 996 (citing 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)). "When there is 
any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from it, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the 
crime can be reasonably made, our inquiry stops and we sustain 
the verdict." Id. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR THEFT CONVICTIONS WERE 
PROPERLY ADMITTED FOR PURPOSES OF IMPEACH-
MENT PURSUANT TO RULE 609, UTAH RULES OF 
EVIDENCE. 
Defendant filed a motion in limine in which he 
requested a ruling from the trial court regarding admission of 
evidence of his prior convictions for purposes of impeachment. 
The court granted the motion with respect to defendant's 
convictions for burglary, two convictions for escape, assault 
with a deadly weapon, robbery, child abuse, and battery; it 
denied the motion with respect to defendant's prior convictions 
for theft and theft by deception, ruling that they were 
admissible under Rule 609 (R. 1525, 1529). 
Rule 609(a), Utah R. Evid., provides as follows: 
For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he 
has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if elicited from him or established 
by public record during cross-examination but 
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death 
or imprisonment in excess of one year under 
the law under which he was convicted, and the 
court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) 
involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
(Emphasis added•) 
The trial court ruled that theft is a crime of 
dishonesty. In making its determination, it relied on State v. 
Cintron, 680 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1984) in which this Court found 
that a misdemeanor theft conviction involves "dishonesty or false 
statement." This Court also stated in Terry v. Zions Co-op 
Mercantile, 605 P.2d 314, 324 n. 36 (Utah 1979) (citations 
omitted), this Court stated that "[a]ny crime involving the theft 
of another person's property is generally considered as involving 
dishonesty." Although Cintron was decided under former Rule 21, 
Utah R. Evid. (1971), the language contained in the former rule 
and present Rule 609 is identical. Former Rule 21, Utah R. Evid. 
(1971) provided that crimes "involving dishonesty or false 
statement" were admissible. Consequently, the trial court 
properly relied on this Court's interpretation of dishonesty, 
which includes misdemeanor theft, in making its determination. 
The rule says that a conviction involving dishonesty or false 
statement "shall be admitted." Utah R. Evid. 609(a). 
Consequently, the balancing test set forth in State v. Banner 717 
P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) is inapplicable. 
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Defendant relies on Banner for his claim that the 
Cintron case is not applicable and that the trial court 
erroneously relied on it to justify his conclusion that theft is 
a crime of dishonesty. In Banner, 717 P.2d at 1333-34, this 
Court stated that the rules of evidence adopted in 1983 provide a 
-fresh starting place" for the law of evidence in Utah and in an 
effort to achieve uniformity with the federal rules it would look 
to federal decisions to aid in interpreting the Utah rules. See 
also State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 1986). 
The federal decisions addressing Rule 609, Fed. R. 
Evid., however, are in conflict. There is a split of authority 
as to whether theft constitutes a crime of dishonesty. See 
United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 362-363 (D.C. Cir. 1976); 
United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1977). Although, 
it appears that the majority of federal courts have ruled that 
theft is not a crime of dishonesty, Smith at 845-848, that 
position is not binding on this Court. The better reasoned 
position, is that theft constitutes a crime of dishonesty or 
false statement. 
In United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 845-6 (7th 
Cir. 1977), the court stated: 
Beginning with the language of the Rule 
itself, we note that "dishonesty" is by 
definition, a "disposition to lie, cheat, or 
steal." Random House College Dictionary 380 
(abr. ed. 1973) (emphasis added). Moreover, 
H[i)n common human experience, acts of 
deceit, fraud, cheating or stealing . . . are 
universally regarded as conduct which 
reflects adversely on a man's honesty and 
integrity." Gordon v. United States, 127 
U.S.App.D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936, 940, cert, 
denied, 390 U.S. 1029, 88 S.Ct. 1421, 20 
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L.Ed.2d 287 (1967 (emphasis added). A common 
sense approach to the language of Rule 
609(a)(2) would support the conclusion that 
[the defendant's] prior conviction was 
admissible because theft is a crime involving 
"dishonesty" within the common meaning of 
that term. 
Because of the division in the federal courts on this issue, the 
federal decisions provide little guidance on how the rule should 
be interpreted. If the objective in following federal case law 
is to provide uniformity between the Utah rules and the federal 
rules, the purpose will not be advanced by ruling contrary to 
Cintron that theft is not a crime of dishonesty or false 
statement because there is no uniformity in the federal courts. 
A number of state courts that have decided this issue 
have rejected the federal decisions that find that theft is not a 
crime of dishonesty or false statement. See e.g. People v. 
Morstatter, 362 N.E.2d 809, 810 (111. App. 1977); State v. 
Miller, 229 N.W.2d 762, 769 (Iowa 1975); State v. Page, 449 So. 
2d 813, 816 (Fla. 1987); State v. Johnson, 460 N.E.2d 625, 629 
(Ohio App. 1983). 
The Washington Supreme Court recently addressed this 
issue in State v. Brown, 43 Crim. Law. Rep. (BNA) 2315 (Wash. 
July 14, 1988) and held that theft, shoplifting, and robbery are 
crimes involving "dishonesty" and are therefore admissible for 
impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2). The court overruled 
its previous decision in which it had held that theft is a crime 
of dishonesty only when it involves an element of fraud or 
deceit, finding that its previous reliance on federal case law 
was misguided. The court stated: 
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First, federal case law interpreting federal 
rules is not binding upon this court. 
Second, we have grave reservations about the 
soundness of the federal courts' restrictive 
construction of Rule 609(a)(2) to exclude per 
se admissibility of prior theft convictions. 
The courts appear to give little independent 
meaning to the word MdishonestyM even though 
the disjunctive "or" is used to link the word 
to "false statement" Several states with 
rules similar to ours have concluded that 
theft crimes involve dishonesty or false 
statement despite the federal courts' 
insistence to the contrary. 
The term "dishonest" implies the act or 
practice of telling a lie, or of cheating, 
deceiving and stealing. Webster's Third New 
Int'l Dictionary 659 (1981). Crimes of theft 
involve stealing and thus are clearly 
encompassed within the term dishonest. There 
is no reason to believe that a person's 
propensity to lie may be demonstrated by past 
acts of lying but not by past acts of 
dishonest conduct. The purpose of 
impeachment—enlightening the jury with 
respect to the defendant's credibility as a 
witness—is met by allowing admissibility of 
prior convictions evidencing dishonesty, 
regardless of the fact that the conduct had 
as its purpose the taking of another's 
property. 
Id. at 2316-17. 
Because this Court has previously interpreted the 
language "dishonesty or false statement" to encompass the crime 
of misdemeanor theft, because the federal law is in conflict and 
not controlling, and because common sense dictates that theft is, 
indeed, a crime of dishonesty, this Court should find that a 
defendant can be impeached by evidence of prior theft convictions 
pursuant to Rule 609(a)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
In the present case, the trial court ruled, in limine, 
that evidence of defendant's prior convictions for theft by 
deception and theft was admissible. Defendant testified to these 
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convictions on direct examination (R. 946). It is implicit in 
the conviction for theft by deception that some element of deceit 
was involved; the title of the offense leaves little room for 
doubt. Regardless, the crime did, in fact, involve fraudulent 
and deceitful means (R. 1526-27). Thus, even if this Court were 
to adopt the majority position in the federal courts which 
interprets the phrase "dishonesty or false statement" to require 
an element of fraud or deceit, defendant's conviction for theft 
by deception was properly admitted. Because the theft by 
deception was properly admitted, even if the "straight" theft 
were improperly admitted, its admission would at most be harmless 
error. Any prejudice to defendant would have been minimal. 
The standard of review for error in cases involving an 
abuse of discretion by the trial court in not excluding evidence 
of prior convictions for impeachment purposes, is whether "there 
was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant." State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Utah 1987) 
citing, State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); Banner, 
717 P.2d at 1335 (citing State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1984). Even if this Court were to find an abuse of discretion on 
the part of the trial court in ruling the defendant's theft 
convictions admissible for impeachment purposes, the error would 
have been of a non-constitutional nature and did not affect his 
substantial rights. In accordance with Utah R. Crim. P. 30, any 
error not affecting the "substantial rights" of the defendant 
shall be disregarded. Because the evidence at trial clearly 
established defendant's guilt, even if he had been improperly 
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impeached/ there is no likelihood there would have been a more 
favorable result without the contested evidence. 
POINT III 
THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF TROOPER BRINGHURST'S 
UNIFORM WAS GREATER THAN ITS PREJUDICIAL 
EFFECT AND WAS, THEREFORE, ADMISSIBLE UNDER 
RULE 403. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that 
evidence may be excluded at trial if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of "unfair prejudice." It 
is the contention of the defendant, in the present matter, that 
the probative value of Trooper Bringhurst's uniform is less than 
the prejudicial effect and therefore, the trial court erred in 
its admission. Within the context of Rule 403, "unfair 
prejudice" requires that the disputed evidence have more than 
mere detrimental effect on the defendant's case; it must have an 
"undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, 
commonly, though not necessarily an emotional one." United 
States v. Grassi, 602 F.2d 1192, 1197 (5th Cir. 1979) (citations 
omitted). 
Defendant's allegation is based on his belief that the 
admission of Trooper Bringhurst's blood-stained uniform inflamed 
and prejudiced the jury causing them to convict because of their 
sympathy and support for the injured trooper, rather than because 
of their belief that he actually committed the crime charged (Br. 
of App. at 36). As authority for his allegation, defendant 
relies on cases in which gruesome photographs or slides of the 
victim's body before, during, and after an autopsy had been 
performed were admitted into evidence by the trial courts and 
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later deemed inflammatory by the reviewing courts because the 
evidence failed to address a disputed issue. See e.g., State v. 
Chappie, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439 (Utah 1988); State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986), 
citing, State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah 1979)); State v. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988); State v. Beers, 448 P.2d 104 
(Ariz. App. 1968); State v. Oxendine, 335 P.2d 940 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1958); and State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 512 (Utah 
1968). 
In its determination that the gruesome photographs of 
the charred body and skull of the victim did not have probative 
value as to whether the defendant was in fact the perpetrator, 
the Chappie court set forth criteria which the trial court should 
consider when determining the probative value of gruesome 
exhibits: 
In making this determination, the trial court 
must examine the purpose of the offer. . . . 
[We have] identified the following uses for 
which allegedly [gruesome evidence] may be 
admitted in a homicide prosecution: to prove 
the corpus delicti, to identify the victim, 
to show the nature and location of the fatal 
injury, to help determine the degree of 
atrociousness of the crime, to corroborate 
state witnesses, to illustrate or explain 
testimony, and to corroborate the state's 
theory of how and why the homicide was 
committed. If any of these questions is 
contested, either expressly or implicitly, 
then the trial court may find the [evidence 
has] more than mere technical relevance; it 
may find that the [evidence has] a 'bearing' 
to prove a contested issue in the case and 
may, therefore, be admissible notwithstanding 
a tendency to create prejudice. 
Chappie, 660 P.2d at 1215 (citations omitted). Accord, State v. 
Royball, 710 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1985) (evidence may be relevant 
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if it assists the trier of fact in understanding the nature of 
the crime charged or how the crime occurred); State v. Garcia, 
663 P. 2d 60 (Utah 1983) (the more essential the evidentiary value 
of the evidence the greater the defendant's burden to require its 
exclusion on the basis that its inflammatory nature would be 
prejudicial to him). 
In State v. Steele, 586 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1978), cited 
by defendant as an example of a reviewing court determining it 
was error on the part of the trial court to admit the victim's 
bloody shirt, the court based its decision on the fact that the 
entrance and exit wounds had been clearly demonstrated by 
photographs of the body of the victim, with the result that 
introduction of the victim's bloody shirt added nothing to the 
evidence to be considered by the jury but rather tended to arouse 
and inflame their emotions. Relying upon the criteria set forth 
in Chappie, the Steele opinion is distinguishable from the 
present case. The admission of Trooper Bringhurst's uniform was 
necessary in order for the State to: (1) establish that Johnson 
knowingly fired at a uniformed officer of the law, and (2) 
corroborate the testimony of Trooper Bringhurst. Therefore, 
defendant's allegations are without merit because the probative 
value of the uniform was greater than its prejudicial effect and 
the evidence was properly admitted by the trial court. 
It is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court to determine whether the 
probative value of the evidence outweighs the 
possible adverse effect it might have on the 
jury, and the discretion on the part of a 
trial judge to admit or reject evidence 
should not be interfered with by this Court 
unless manifest error is shown. 
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State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1352-53 (Utah 1977) (citing State 
v. Poef 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 512, 515 (Utah 1968)). Accord, 
State v. Lopez, 626 P.2d 483 (Utah 1981); State v. Danker, 599 
P.2d 518 (Utah 1979); State v. Renzo, 443 P.2d 392 (Utah 1968). 
The prosecution, as in every case, had the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense. 
The prosecution did not know until the defense presented its case 
what the defense would be; therefore, the State was entitled to 
present all relevant evidence to support its case. Apparently, 
from defendant's statements to Officer Evans, he was going to 
assert that someone other than he shot the trooper; therefore, 
considerable effort went into ruling out this possibility. Other 
possible defenses were that the gun accidentally discharged or 
that defendant did not know Bringhurst was a law enforcement 
officer. One of the elements of the crime required proof that 
defendant knowingly and intentionally attempted to kill a law 
enforcement officer; therefore, the uniform was relevant to 
establish that there could be no mistake as to Trooper 
Bringhurst's association with law enforcement. Earlier that day 
defendant had, in a threatening manner, referenced police 
officers when telling Jean Hickam that he had guns and that no 
one should try to stop him. Additionally, the defense appeared 
to focus on discrediting the Trooper's credibility and ability to 
perceive and recall; therefore, the uniform was relevant to 
corroborate his testimony. 
This Court should affirm the decision of the trial 
court, to admit the blood-stained uniform, State's exhibits 41 
-45-
and 42, because it was relevant to establish that defendant 
intended to shoot a police officer, a disputed issue in the case. 
Furthermore, as compared to the gruesome photographs of victim's 
bodies, a shirt with dried blood stains on the shoulder is not 
likely to incite passion or inflame the emotions of a jury. The 
probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. Therefore, 
the trial court acted within the scope of its discretion in 
admitting Trooper Bringhurst's uniform. 
POINT IV 
THE TESTIMONY OF JEAN HICKAM WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED. 
The trial court properly denied defense counsel's 
motions to exclude the testimony of Jean Hickam because her 
testimony was relevant and the probative value outweighed any 
prejudicial effect. 
A. Hickam's testimony was relevant. 
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that 
evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Relying upon 
standards set forth in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986), 
defendant alleges that the testimony of Jean Hickam was 
irrelevant and, therefore, improperly admitted at trial. "Rule 
401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that for evidence to 
be relevant, it must have a tendency to make the existence of any 
fact of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
Id. at 1316. Defendant further alleges that Hickam's testimony 
was improperly admitted under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1983) which provides: 
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Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Defendant's interpretation of the aforementioned 
authorities is erroneous in view of the facts of the present 
case. Hickam's testimony was relevant to defendant's intent. He 
was angry and upset that evening. During the telephone 
conversation with Hickam, she heard defendant click the 
mechanisms of his gun as he made comments to the effect of "load" 
and "unload" (R. 786). This is inconsistent with defendant's 
testimony that he got the guns from a friend earlier that night 
at a party and had tried not to touch them too much to avoid 
causing fingerprints (R. 984). It also serves to rebut his 
testimony that he does not own guns and had no idea how the guns 
he had acquired at the party worked (R. 985-86). Defendant had 
made reference during the conversation to police officers when 
stating that he was going to harm Michael Poulton and no one 
should get in his way (R. 805, 809). He told Hickam he had a 
rifle with a scope and would use it if the police were called (R. 
805). Evidence of Johnson's intent to shoot a police officer is 
not only relevant, but "material to the crime charged," i.e., 
attempted murder. State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1987). 
Hickam's testimony comes within the exception stated in Rule 
404(b) and was therefore properly admitted for the purpose of 
establishing Johnson's intent to shoot Trooper Bringhurst. 
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Defendant's remaining cited authorities are also easily 
distinguished. He contends that evidence of past conduct, where 
no conviction is had, is not admissible "if the purpose is to 
disgrace the defendant as a person of evil character with a 
propensity to commit crime and thus likely to have committed the 
crime charged." State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1978). 
However, this Court went on to state in Daniels that, "if the 
evidence has relevancy to explain the circumstances surrounding 
the instant crime, it is admissible for that purpose; and the 
fact that it may tend to connect the defendant with another crime 
will not render it incompetent." Id. at 882 (citations omitted). 
See State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978) (testimony must be 
relevant to the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant); 
State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985). 
As discussed above, the testimony of Jean Hickam was 
relevant to the shooting of Trooper Bringhurst because it 
directly addresses the issue of defendant's intent. Similar to 
the situation in Daniels, Hickam's testimony is integral to an 
explanation of the incident and, therefore, was properly admitted 
to refute defendant's contention that his threats made earlier in 
the evening of May 26 had nothing to do with the shooting of 
Trooper Bringhurst. Defendant alleges that the focus of the 
threats testified to by Hickam was Michael Poulton and his 
girlfriend, not a highway patrol officer who happened to 
interfere hours later. However, defendant's conduct was closely 
related in time and was part of a series of events that evening. 
See Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-401 (1978). Hickam's testimony does 
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not describe a prior unrelated bad act on the part of defendant 
but rather, a stirring of events which began with defendant's 
threatening statements to Ms. Hickam and ended later that same 
night in the shooting of Trooper Bringhurst. 
In State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1344 (Utah 1977), 
the defendant was charged with three counts of murder in the 
first degree and two counts of aggravated robbery committed 
during the robbery of the Ogden Hi-Fi Shop on April 22, 1974. 
Evidence was admitted that the defendant "had stated in February, 
1974, that he would like to rob a Hi-Fi Shop and would kill 
anyone who got in his way." JEd. In the present matter, this 
Court should affirm the admission of Hickam's testimony regarding 
threats made by defendant on May 26, which revealed his intent to 
shoot anyone, including police officers, who happened to 
interfere with his plans to go after Poulton. Jean Hickam's 
testimony was relevant to the critical issue of defendant's 
intent. Thus, her testimony was properly admitted. 
B. The Probative Value of Jean Hickam's Testimony 
Far Outweighs Any Prejudicial Effect on Johnson's 
Character. 
Rules 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that 
evidence may be excluded at trial if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Defendant 
contends that Hickam's testimony conjured up evidence of prior 
bad acts on his part which prejudiced the jury to convict because 
of bad character rather than because of actual guilt of the crime 
charged. For the reasons set forth above, this assertion is 
without merit. 
Relying upon United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000, 1004 
(3rd Cir. 1976), Defendant implies that the prosecution had no 
actual need to introduce Hickam's testimony and therefore created 
a significant risk of undue prejudice against him. However, the 
Cook opinion is easily distinguishable from the present case. 
The Cook court applied a balancing test to determine the 
admissibility of the defendant's previous felony convictions and 
stated that "[t]he trial court must consider the government's 
actual need for that evidence. The necessity for the testimony 
in question must be measured against the high potential that 
proof of a prior offense has for arousing the jury against the 
accused." Rl. at 1004 (footnote omitted). Unlike the situation 
in Cook, Hickam's testimony was necessary to prove an essential 
element of the crime charged—defendant's intent. In Cook, the 
government had a variety of defendant's prior felony convictions 
from which to choose one for presentation to the jury. The 
government then proceeded to choose the defendant's sodomy 
conviction with apparent disregard for its high potential toward 
inflaming the jury. In the present case, the prosecution did not 
attempt to introduce a prior felony conviction, but rather 
evidence of Johnson's statements which revealed his intent to 
shoot any police officer who interfered with his plans to go 
after Poulton. Defendant also relies on Gov't, of the Virgin 
Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283 (3rd Cir. 1976) for the 
proposition that Hickam's testimony should have been excluded on 
the ground that the interest in protecting a defendant's 
presumption of innocence precludes introduction of evidence of 
prior bad acts committed by the defendant. The Toto court 
accordingly disallowed testimony of the defendant's prior 
misdemeanor conviction. The present case is distinguishable 
because Hickam's testimony does not reveal a prior conviction on 
the part of Johnson, rather, Hickam's testimony goes to conduct 
on the part of Johnson which was part of one criminal episode, 
the shooting of Trooper Bringhurst. 
Johnson further contends that the testimony of Jean 
Hickam was prejudicial in that it served to confuse the jury. 
This contention is unsupportable in light of the fact that 
Hickam's testimony clarified the nature of Johnson's conduct and 
intent on the night of the shooting. 
Because the testimony of Jean Hickam cannot be 
described as revealing prejudicial prior crimes committed by 
defendant, the fears expressed by defense counsel (Br. of App. at 
42) that defendant was convicted on less evidence than would 
ordinarily be required and that defendant Johnson was required to 
defend an entire lifetime of incidents in a single trial are 
without merit. Therefore, Johnson was not submitted to unfair 
prejudice by Hickam's testimony because the probative value far 
outweighed any prejudicial effect the testimony may have had. 
C. The Trial Court's Decision To Admit The Testimony 
of Jean Hickam Was Not An Abuse of Its Discretion. 
Relying upon State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 
(Utah 1987), Johnson alleges that the trial court's decision to 
admit the testimony of Jean Hickam is grounds for reversal 
because the outcome would likely have been different had the 
testimony not been admitted. The Knight opinion is 
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distinguishable from the present matter. In Knight, the 
prosecutor failed to comply with a discovery request made by 
defense counsel for the address and telephone numbers of two key 
witnesses. This Court held it was reversible error to have 
allowed the witnesses to testify because there was a reasonable 
likelihood thatf absent the error, the outcome of the trial would 
have been more favorable for the defendant, i.e., defendant's 
counsel would have had the opportunity to prepare a response. In 
the present matter, Hickam's testimony did not come as a surprise 
to defendant, who had a fair opportunity to prepare a defense. 
Whether to admit Hickam's testimony was within the discretion of 
the trial court. 
It is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court to determine whether the 
probative value of the evidence outweighs the 
possible adverse effect it might have on the 
jury, and the discretion on the part of a 
trial judge to admit or reject evidence 
should not be interfered with by this Court 
unless manifest error is shown. 
Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1352-53 (citing State v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 
205, 443 P.2d 392 (1968)). See also, State v. Gallo, 582 P.2d 
558, 565 (Wash. App. 1978). 
The trial court did not commit manifest error or an 
abuse of its discretion in the decision to admit the testimony of 
Jean Hickam concerning the evidence relevant to defendant's state 
of mind and intent. Hickam's testimony was integral to an 
explanation of the series of events on May 26 which ended with 
the shooting of Trooper Bringhurst. Hickam's testimony also 
pointed to inconsistencies in defendant's testimony, specifically 
his acquisition of and knowledge regarding the guns. Thus, 
•52-
Johnson's first contention that Ms. Hickam's testimony was 
irrelevant and therefore improperly admitted is without merit. 
The trial court's decision that Hickam's testimony has 
relevant was not an abuse of discretion. The testimony was 
relevant to defendant's intent, which was the central issue in 
the case. Further Hickam's testimony was probative and the 
probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect. Ms. Hickam's 
testimony was necessary to Johnson's intent to shoot any one, 
including police officers, who got in his way, a material element 
of the crime with which Johnson was charged. Therefore, any 
prejudicial effect Ms. Hickam's testimony may have had was far 
outweighed by its probative value. Because the trial court 
clearly acted within the scope of its discretion in deciding to 
allow the testimony of Ms. Hickam, no manifest error was 
committed and therefore, no grounds for reversal are present. 
State v. McCardle, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982); State v. Pierre, 572 
P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978). 
POINT V 
OFFICER VERN OLSEN'S TESTIMONY THAT HE WAS 
GUARDING DEFENDANT AT THE HOSPITAL JUST DAYS 
AFTER THE CRIME WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Defendant claims that the testimony of Officer Vern 
Olsen constituted reversible error when the following testimony 
was elicited during direct exam: 
Q. (By the Prosecutor) Officer Olsen, would 
you state your full name for the record, 
please. 
A. Yes. Vern Lee Olsen. 
Q. What is your occupation? 
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A. Police officer. 
Q. How long have you been a police officer? 
A. Eight and a half years. 
Q. Who do you work for? 
A. Salt Lake City Corporation. 
Q. Are you familiar with the defendant, 
Danny Lee Johnson? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. And how did you come to know him? 
A. I spent guard duty one day up at the 
hospital on him. 
Q. Which hospital. 
A. UMC, I believe. 
Q. Could it have been LDS Hospital? 
A. I am sorry, yes, it was. 
Q. Do you recall particularly which hospital 
it was now that you think about it? 
A. Not offhand. I have had several guard 
duties in the last little while. 
Q. And what is hospital guard duty? 
A. Basically you're there to stop any escape 
attempts. 
(R. 1075). 
The prosecutor then directed the attention of the 
witness to May 31, 1986, and elicited testimony regarding 
statements made by the defendant concerning the shooting incident 
(R. 1075-79). 
Defendant claims that this testimony, specifically the 
question regarding what constitutes guard duty, was so 
prejudicial that he is entitled to a new trial. Defendant claims 
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that Officer Olsen's explanation of guard duty—that is being 
present to prevent escape attempts—somehow paints defendant as 
an "escape risk," and that therefore he was labeled as violent 
and dangerous (Br. App. at 45.). Defendant's contention is 
without merit and is not supported by the evidence. 
The question asked of Officer Olsen was general in 
nature concerning his duties. The officer's answer was that he 
was there to prevent any escape attempts—not that defendant is a 
violent, dangerous person and was an escape risk. The officer 
had been on guard duty so many times that he could not 
specifically remember whether he was at University Medical Center 
or LDS Hospital; the jury was left with the impression that guard 
duty is a routine event, and did not take place because defendant 
is an "escape risk" as he alleges. 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 
(Utah 1985) is misplaced. In Saunders, this Court stated that 
evidence of prior crimes is not admissible to show criminal 
disposition of the defendant, and that such evidence is presumed 
prejudicial absent a reason for its admission other than to show 
criminal disposition. This Court held that evidence that 
Saunders was a restricted person, for purposes of establishing 
the crime of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person, was improperly joined with the crime of burglary; the 
evidence clearly implied that defendant had been convicted of a 
prior crime. First, in the present case, no evidence of prior 
crimes was presented during Officer Olsen's testimony. Even if 
defendant had been characterized as an escape risk, it would not 
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constitute evidence of prior crimes. Second, the prosecutor's 
question and the officer's answer were to provide background and 
foundation for the subsequent testimony, and were not directed 
specifically at defendant but rather to the officer's general 
duties. 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 
(Utah 1986) is also misplaced. In Slowe, this Court held that 
evidence of defendant's prior perjury conviction was admissible 
despite it having occurred over ten years previously because its 
probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect. In its 
determination, this Court found that what is probative is likely 
to be prejudicial and defined "prejudicial" as being 
"inflammatory in the sense that the jury may use the conviction 
against the defendant for purposes other than determining 
defendant's credibility, and therefore would tend to induce the 
jury to render a verdict outside the relevant substantive 
evidence being on the material elements of the crime." ^d. at 
112-13. First, in this case, there was no evidence of a prior 
conviction or prior crimes. Second, as set forth above, the 
introduction of this evidence was not inflammatory and did not 
have a prejudicial effect on the jury. The present case is 
unlike cases in which the jury is allowed to see a defendant in 
"handcuffs, shackles, or jail clothes;" in those cases, the 
inevitable association between the prejudicial material and the 
defendant would be readily apparent. 
Officer Olsen's testimony related to events less than 
four days after defendant attempted to kill a police officer. 
-56-
The jury was aware that defendant had been taken to LDS Hospital 
for treatment of his wounds. The jury obviously knew that 
defendant was eventually charged with the crime. That the jury 
knew that defendant was "guarded" only four days after the crime 
is not inflammatory. Even if the evidence had some level of 
prejudicial effect, the prejudice would be minimal and certainly 
does not justify a reversal in this case. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN DECLINING TO 
DECLARE LT. FALLOWS A HOSTILE WITNESS. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in refusing 
to declare Lt. Fallows a hostile witness in order to allow the 
defense, who had called him as a witness, to proceed with leading 
questions pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 611(c). Defendant claims 
that the rule does not require that actual hostility be 
demonstrated, and that the trial court misunderstood the rule and 
consequently abused his discretion making in the ruling. 
However, defendant makes no claim that he is entitled to relief 
on this ground. As set forth below, even if the trial court was 
in error in refusing to declare Lt. Fallows a hostile witness for 
purposes of allowing direct examination by leading questions, 
there was no prejudice and, therefore, defendant is not entitled 
to relief. Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467 
(11th Cir. 1984). 
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Utah R. Evid. 611(c) states: 
Leading questions should not be used on the 
direct examination of a witness except as may 
be necessary to develop his testimony. 
Ordinarily leading questions should be 
permitted on cross-examination. When a party 
calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or 
a witness identified with an adverse party, 
interrogation may be by leading questions. 
(Empha sis added.) 
The word "may" signifies that leading questions are not 
mandatory, but may be used when appropriate. The word "may" also 
implies that the determination is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court. See Ellis v. City of Chicago, 667 F.2d 606, 613 
(7th Cir. 1981). In the present case, the trial court ruled 
initially that Lt. Fallows was not a hostile witness within the 
ambit of Rule 611(c). Prior to making the ruling, both the 
defense and the prosecution elicited testimony from Lt. Fallows 
outside the presence of the jury to aid the trial court in making 
its determination. 
Lt. Fallows was asked by defense counsel, "Is it true 
that you did not want any appearance of associating with the 
defense?" (R. 869.) Lt. Fallows responded, "I wouldn't say that 
that is a correct statement. I honor the subpoena." (R. 869.) 
When asked about his feelings concerning the case, he said, "It's 
a situation where obviously I have feelings but I also have a 
duty which I will perform." (R. 870.) Lt. Fallows swore to tell 
the truth regardless of the consequences (R. 872), and he 
promised to answer all questions fairly and honestly regardless 
of his feelings concerning the case (R. 872). In fact, Lt. 
Fallows said, -That's where the reluctance comes in, because I 
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will answer truthfully and honestly regardless of the eventual 
outcome, and that is, I guess, what causes the reluctance within 
myself that I have no choice but to tell the truth (R. 873), 
Whether to allow leading questions during direct 
examination is a matter left to the discretion of the trial 
court. United States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1979); 
Bruce Hughes, Inc. v. Inqels & Associates, 653 P.2d 88 (Colo. 
App. 1982). However, even courts that find mere identification 
with the adverse party to be sufficient, require a showing of 
actual prejudice before the defendant is entitled to relief on 
appeal. Ellis v. City of Chicago, 667 F.2d at 613. Even if this 
Court were to find Lt. Fallows should have declared hostile, 
because defendant was not prejudiced by the ruling, the decision 
of the trial court was, at most, harmless error. 
The trial court did not allow defense counsel to 
proceed at the outset of her examination of Lt. Fallows by 
leading questions; however, after obtaining background 
information and foundation for the substance of the testimony, 
defense counsel began using leading questions (R. 884). The 
trial court overruled the prosecutor's objection to the leading 
questions (R. 886-87), stating that it may be necessary for 
defense counsel to lead. As a result, during most of the 
remaining direct examination—which was the significant portion 
of the testimony—defense counsel used leading questions (R. 887-
94, Appendix A). 
The record reflects, despite occasional confusion 
regarding the questions, total cooperation on the part of Lt. 
Fallows. Defendant did not claim at trial at the conclusion of 
Lt. Fallow's testimony that he was unable to elicit any desired 
information from him. On appeal, defendant has failed to 
identify what information he was unable to obtain. Consequently, 
any claim of prejudice would be totally speculative. Ellis, 667 
F.2d at 613; Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467, 
1969 (11th Cir. 1984). 
Rule 611(c) provides that leading questions "may" be 
asked on direct examination when the witness is identified with 
the adverse party. Thus the matter is within the trial court's 
discretion. Based on Lt. Fallows cooperation during direct 
examination, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
failing to declare him a hostile witness. Defendant must show 
actual prejudice as the result of the error. He has not made 
such a claim, and the record would not support such an 
allegation. The error, if any, was harmless and should be 
disregarded. Utah R. Crim. P. 30. Consequently, defendant is 
not entitled to a reversal of his conviction. 
POINT VII 
BECAUSE TROOPER BRINGHURST WAS IMPEACHED 
DURING CROSS-EXAMINATION, HIS REPUTATION FOR 
TRUTHFULNESS WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
The focus of the defense was to elicit prior 
inconsistent statements, however minor, made by Trooper 
Bringhurst. The theory, as argued by defense counsel in closing, 
was that if Trooper Bringhurst was not certain of what occurred, 
the jury could not convict (R. 682). During cross examination, 
defense counsel brought out several inconsistencies between the 
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statements made to Detective Johnson the day after the incident, 
to Lt. Fallows two days after the incident, to Reporter Tom Walsh 
ten days after the incident, and made at the preliminary hearing 
which took place on June 25, 1986, about a month after the 
incident. 
One of the inconsistencies was Trooper Bringhurst's 
testimony at trial that after he had asked defendant whether he 
said he had been drinking, defendant raised the shotgun and said, 
HIt doesn't make any difference, does it?M (R. 1426) During 
cross examination, defense counsel asked the trooper about a 
statement made to Lt. Fallows two days after the incident, which 
was that when discussing defendant's statement he said, "Hell, I 
wish I could remember what he said." (R. 535). 
Trooper Bringhurst was also questioned about several 
other statements that, particularly when taken out of context, 
were inconsistent with his trial testimony. For example, the 
trooper testified at trial that he stopped about five to six feet 
from defendant's car (R. 1425). At one point during the hospital 
interview, he had told Lt. Fallows that he was 18 inches away 
from the car (R. 893). He was also questioned about inconsistent 
statements he had made concerning the position of his flashlight 
(R. 80, 87-108-136, 37-512-514); how fast defendant's car was 
traveling on 3rd West (R. 121, 122, 507-08); what he had said to 
defendant as he approached the car (Det. Johnson testified that 
Trooper Bringhurst had told him that he had asked defendant for 
his drivers license—not whether he had been drinking) (R. 1062); 
whether he believed when he was shot that he was going to live or 
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die (R. 90, 148, 546-47); and whether he had eye contact with 
defendant at the light at the 13th South off-ramp (R. 887). 
There were numerous other attempts to bring out additional 
inconsistent statements. 
Defendant's contention that he elicited prior 
inconsistent statements for the purpose of establishing Trooper 
Bringhurst's inability to recall the event, not to raise doubts 
as to his credibility, is a distinction without a difference. If 
Trooper Bringhurst truly could not recall what occurred, he would 
consequently be a witness who was not credible. Some statements, 
while taken out of context, were definitely inconsistent. His 
character for truthfulness had been attacked and, therefore, his 
credibility had been attacked within the meaning of the rule. 
The focus of the cross-examination was to elicit prior 
inconsistent statements, which had the effect of impuning the 
trooper's credibility. The obvious implication was that his 
character for truthfulness was questionable. For example, if the 
trooper could not remember what defendant said as he approached 
the car at the point when he was questioned by Lt. Fallows, he 
would not likely remember it later and the inference would be 
that he must have made it up. 
Utah Rule Evid. 608(a) states: 
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct 
of witness. 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of 
character. The credibility of a witness may 
be attacked or supported by evidence in the 
form of opinion or reputation, but subject to 
these limitations: (1) the evidence may 
refer only to character for the truthfulness 
or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of 
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truthful character is admissible only after 
the character of the witness for truthfulness 
has been attacked by opinion or reputation 
evidence or otherwise. 
In Beard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 503 (7th Cir. 
1979), a case in which the plaintiff had been convicted of murder 
and then sued an FBI agent who had investigated the case, the 
U.S. attorney who had prosecuted the case testified at trial 
regarding the agent's reputation for truthfulness. Evidence of 
the agent's inconsistent statements had been admitted, which 
resulted in an attack on the agent's credibility. The court 
found that the use of prior inconsistent statements may 
constitute an attack on credibility and, therefore, the U.S. 
attorney's testimony that the agent had a reputation for 
truthfulness was properly admitted. The court cited United 
States v. Hall, 422 U.S. 171 (1975) in which the Supreme Court 
stated "that '[a] basic rule of evidence provides that prior 
inconsistent statements may be used to impeach the credibility of 
a witness.'" Jki. at 503. The court concluded that the trial 
court's ruling to allow the testimony pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 
608(a) was not an abuse of discretion. 
Trooper Bringhurst's credibility had been impeached by 
the defense focus on inconsistent statements. Therefore, 
pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 608(a), evidence of Trooper 
Bringhurst's truthfulness was properly admitted. 
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POINT VIII 
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AFFORDED BY 
THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS WERE 
NOT VIOLATED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
ASKED QUESTIONS BY TWO JURORS DURING THE 
TRIAL. 
Defendant contends that he was denied his right to a 
fair trial and that the denial rises to the level of a violation 
of the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution. He also contends that his right to a fair and 
impartial jury guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution was violated. Defendant asserts that the conduct of 
two jurors during the course of the trial amounted to reversible 
error. 
During the course of the trial, the following dialogue 
occurred. 
Q. (By Defense Counsel) Do you recall 
testifying at the preliminary hearing that 
you saw what you believed to be a shotgun? 
A. (Trooper Bringhurst) I don't recall 
making that statement. 
THE COURT: Just one minute. 
JUROR #6: I have a question. We were told 
what was said in here today is what we're 
supposed to go by totally; is that right? 
THE COURT: Just the evidence. 
JUROR #6: Anything presented today. 
THE COURT: Any time during the course of a 
trial the only thing you're to consider is 
the testimony from the witness who is talking 
or any of the evidence that is introduced 
into court. 
JUROR #6: Okay. I'm just wondering. I know 
myself, I cannot remember things that 
happened — 
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THE COURT: Okay. Now, what you're going to 
have to do is take the notes as much as 
possible and then you're going to have to try 
to recollect at the time you deliberate as to 
what was taking place, then collectively, 
you're going to all have an opportunity to 
discuss the testimony of each of the 
witnesses. And during that discussion, the 
notes that you have taken and what you 
remember is what you're going to be 
considering and nothing else extraneous. 
MS. PALACIOS: Your Honor, I think also if 
the Court would indicate that the 
significance will be tied up by the attorneys 
and that they just need to listen to the 
evidence. 
THE COURT: Yes. They will be giving a 
closing argument where they will try to piece 
together everything like they did in the 
opening argument. 
JUROR #6: That is what my guestion was. 
THE COURT: From that you will have to put it 
all together, because they will tell you what 
each of these things meant and then what each 
testified to. 
JUROR #6: That's what I was looking for. 
JUROR #9: Maybe somebody doesn't know. I 
don't know what a sawed off shotgun is. Is 
it the barrel or the handle or both, or what? 
You keep talking about a sawed off shotgun. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. PALACIOS: May we approach the bench? 
THE COURT: Right. 
[Discussion at bench.] 
THE COURT: Normally during the trial we 
don't have jurors ask questions. So if you 
have any questions, if you will write it out 
on a note pad, I will discuss it with the two 
counsel so it will not influence the other 
jurors in regards to any questions that you 
may have at this time. 
_ « _ 
JUROR #9: Thank you. 
THE COURT: But at the end, the attorneys, 
like I said, will be making a closing 
statement . . . . 
(R. 1496-98, emphasis added.) 
Defendant contends that this exchange constituted 
Mearly deliberation" by the jury which denied him a fair and 
impartial trial in violation of the due process clause. 
First, defendant did not timely object and therefore 
has not preserved this issue for appeal. State v. Tillman, 750 
P.2d 546 (Utah 1987); State v. Schreuderf 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 
1986). Not only did defense counsel fail to timely object, 
counsel participated in the conversation, thereby encouraging 
further dialogue. Therefore, defendant cannot now be heard to 
complain. After the conclusion of the interchange, while in 
chambers for other defense motions, defense counsel moved for a 
mistrial on the grounds that the jury was deliberating (R. 1501). 
However, the motion was not timely; a contemporaneous objection 
is required in order to preserve the issue, unless a valid reason 
to do otherwise exists. Schreuder at 1222. Defendant did not 
ask that the jurors be questioned regarding the effect of the 
conversation on them, or request a cautionary instruction. 
Further, when the record is viewed in context, it is 
unmistakable that the exchange did not constitute "early 
deliberation" in the sense contemplated by the court in State v. 
Washington, 438 A.2d 1144 (Conn. 1979), relied upon by 
defendant. 
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In Washington# the Connecticut Supreme Court found to 
be error an express instruction given by the trial court to the 
jurors that they could discuss the case during the course of the 
trial so long as they did not take a vote or come to a 
conclusion. The court found that the instruction violated due 
process in that it encouraged the jurors to give premature 
consideration to the evidence prior to receiving the benefit of 
jury instructions. As a result of the instruction, the jurors 
discussed the case each day in the jury room. The court also 
stated that not all juror discussion prior to deliberation 
necessitates reversal because not every act of misconduct 
warrants a new trial. 
In the present case, the trial court did not instruct 
the jury that they could discuss the matter prior to trial. In 
fact, the trial court repeatedly instructed the jury that they 
could not discuss the matter with one another or any one else 
prior to deliberations. See e.g., R. 1386, 1520, 1343, 1170-71, 
1031, 853. The discussion that took place was during the course 
of the cross-examination and is fully disclosed in the record; it 
is clear that no impropriety occurred. 
The jury did not "deliberate" as defendant contends. 
Juror #6's question, when viewed in context, manifests that when 
he asked the question he was not "committing himself to the 
position that Bringhurst's inability to remember details was 
inconsequential and thereby aligning himself with the state." 
(Br. of App. at 61). Rather, the juror's question was in an 
effort to clarify whether he would be obligated to remember all 
details of the evidence presented. When the court explained that 
the jurors would collectively attempt to recall the evidence when 
they deliberated at the end of the trial and that both counsel 
would provide the jurors with an overview of the case during 
closing argument, the juror responded that his question had been 
directed to that concern (R. 1497), not to his concern about 
Trooper Bringhurst being questioned about details he could not 
remember. 
As defendant acknowledges, the facts in the present 
case are easily distinguished from State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 
(Utah 1985) in which this Court found reversible error because a 
juror had conversed outside the courtroom with a state's witness. 
This Court stated that any unauthorized contact between jurors 
and witnesses, attorneys or court personnel raises a rebuttable 
prejudice. In the present case there was no unauthorized 
contact. Everything occurred in open court and on the record. 
The concern that a juror might have been tainted by an 
unauthorized interchange simply does not exist in this case. 
The trial court has a certain amount of discretion to 
allow questions from the jurors during the course of the trial. 
In State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 326 P.2d 102 (Utah 1958) 
this Court stated that, while judges should not generally invite 
questions, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court 
to determine whether to allow unsolicited questions from jurors. 
See also State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 P.2d 57 (Utah 1960). 
While defendant correctly states the standard of review 
for errors that rise to the level of a constitutional violation 
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is whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. 
Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987), in the present case, not only 
was defendant's due process rights guaranteed by the United 
States and Utah Constitutions not denied, there was no error. 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND MOTION FOR MISTRIAL. 
Relying upon standards set forth in State v. Leonard, 
707 P.2d 650 (Utah 1985), defendant asserts that the trial court 
erred in failing to grant defense counsel's motion to withdraw 
and motion for mistrial. However, the facts of the present case 
are distinguishable from those in Leonard; therefore, defendant's 
reliance upon Leonard in the instant case is ill founded. 
In Leonard, defendant's counsel moved for a mistrial 
after the jury was sworn but before any evidence was adduced so 
that she could withdraw from the case in order to testify on 
behalf of the defendant. On review, this Court determined that 
it was error on the part of the trial court to require the 
defendant's counsel to continue to represent the defendant until 
she actually testified, where upon the court would appoint co-
counsel to examine defendant's counsel and argue her credibility 
to the jury. This Court held that defendant's counsel acted 
appropriately and timely in seeking to withdraw prior to trial, 
before having presented her theory of the case to the jury in 
order to avoid raising the issue of her credibility. 
In the present case, the defense counsel's motion to 
withdraw or for a mistrial on the last day of the trial (R. 854), 
after defense counsel's theory of the case had been presented to 
the jury and her stake in the verdict made clear, was neither 
appropriate or timely. In effect, had the trial court granted 
the motions in order to allow defense counsel to testify, it 
would have confused the jury, raising the issue of defense 
counsel's credibility by combining her role as defendant's 
advocate with that of witness. This danger was recognized by 
this Court in Leonard: 
It is widely recognized that the credibility 
of an attorney who acts as a witness in his 
client's case, as well as his effectiveness 
as an attorney in that case, may be seriously 
compromised. . . . "It has been suggested 
that once [counsel] becomes a witness his 
personal credibility is placed at issue 
before the jury and this may lessen his 
effectiveness as an advocate. It has also 
been indicated that his involvement as a 
witness for his client causes him to be more 
easily subject to impeachment for interest 
and thus lessons his effectiveness as a 
witness." 
Leonard, 707 P.2d at 653 (citations omitted). 
Because defense counsel's motions for withdrawal and 
mistrial in the instant case were neither appropriate nor timely, 
the trial court acted properly in denying them. To have ruled 
otherwise would have created a high potential for prejudicing the 
jury's assessment of defendant's case by introducing the issue of 
defense counsel's credibility. 
Experience teaches that the roles of advocate 
and witness should be separated. If an 
attorney attempts to combine the two roles, 
he is likely to be less effective in each 
role. "That counsel should avoid appearing 
both as advocate and witness except under 
special circumstances is beyond question." 
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Leonard, 707 P.2d at 653 (citations omitted). The facts of the 
present case simply fail to establish a "special circumstance" 
sufficient to warrant defense counsel's motion to withdraw for 
mistrial. 
In Leonard, this Court determined that because defense 
counsel's proffered testimony addressed the critical issue of the 
defendant's actual guilt of the crime charged, the decision not 
to grant defense counsel's motion to withdraw for mistrial 
warranted reversal on the ground that, had the jury believed the 
testimony of defendant's counsel, the jury may not have convicted 
the defendant or it may have convicted the defendant of a lesser 
crime. However, because the proffered testimony of defense 
counsel in the present matter cannot be characterized as critical 
to the jury's decision, the trial court acted properly in denying 
defense counsel's motions to withdraw and for mistrial. 
Defense counsel asserts that her testimony was 
necessary in order to rebut the testimony of Detective Imig of 
the West Valley Police Department on the ground that his 
testimony at trial regarding his relationship with defendant was 
inconsistent with information he conveyed to defense counsel over 
the telephone in January of 1987. However, the allegedly 
inconsistent statements of Detective Imig (Br. of App. at 66-67) 
concern only incidental or insignificant matters rather than 
disputed issues in the case. For example, a critical issue in 
the present case concerns defendant's intent with reference to 
the two weapons he had obtained on May 26. At trial, defendant 
testified that three years earlier, Detective Imig had asked him 
to acquire any illegal guns he came across for the officer (R. 
953). Defense counsel asserts that the purpose of defendant's 
testimony was to establish that he, (1) did not know the guns 
were loaded; (2) that he was not driving around looking for an 
armed confrontation; and (3) did not intend to kill Trooper 
Bringhurst. 
The State offered Detective Imig's testimony in 
rebuttal for the purpose of showing that although Detective Imig 
and defendant had a working relationship in the past, that 
relationship was terminated by Detective Imig's department in May 
of 1985. On cross-examination, Detective Imig conceded that he 
had not directly informed defendant of the department's decision 
to discontinue working with him; however he engaged in no further 
transactions or conversations with defendant. Defendant 
contended that he acquired the two weapons for the purpose of 
showing them to Detective Imig pursuant to their agreement of 
three years past. Given Detective Imig's concession, defense 
counsel's testimony regarding the reason Detective Imig and 
defendant did not meet at the White Horse Lounge in August or 
September of 1985; and the exact number of times Detective Imig 
met with defendant to discuss the purchase of illegal weapons, 
addressed only incidental and insignificant matters. Defense 
counsel's proffered testimony did not reach a disputed issue. 
Furthermore, defense counsel was able to make known to the jury 
through her questioning of Detective Imig, which statements of 
his she believed to be inconsistent and why (R. 846-47). 
Therefore, defense counsel's proffered testimony in the instant 
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case lacked probative value because it would have pertained to 
collateral rather than disputed issues in the case, and because 
defense counsel was able to point out the alleged inconsistencies 
of Detective Imig's testimony to the jury. 
An attorney who participates directly in interviewing a 
witness subjects him or herself to the prospect of being a 
witness at trial. State v. Worthen, slip op. no. 20328 (Utah, 
filed Aug. 23, 1988). Defense counsel, without anyone else 
present, interviewed Detective Imig. Thus, she created this risk 
of being a witness and invited the potential for error. Because 
the situation was created by the defense, and because defendant 
was not prejudiced by the trial court's ruling, it was not error 
to refuse defense counsel's request to withdraw or for a mistrial 
in order to allow her to testify. S=ee State v. Williams, 656 
P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1982). 
In addition, defense counsel contends that the trial 
court's denial of her motions to withdraw and for mistrial denied 
defendant due process of law under the fourteenth amendment and 
compulsory process pursuant to the sixth amendment of the United 
States Constitution. Relying upon Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 
14 (1967), where the United States Supreme Court determined that 
the fourteenth amendment due process clause and the sixth 
amendment compulsory process clause were violated by a state law 
which precluded a defendant from using a co-defendant as a 
witness on his behalf, defense counsel asserts that a defendant's 
right to present witnesses to establish a defense encompasses the 
right to place on the witness stand any person in the courtroom 
including a defendant's own attorney. However, because defense 
counsel's analysis of the Washington opinion excludes 
consideration of the myriad of issues raised by an attorney 
seeking withdrawal in order to testify on behalf of a client, 
defense counsel's reliance upon Washington and Webb v. Texas, 409 
U.S. 95 (1972) is inapposite to the case at hand. 
Finally, the decision whether to grant defense 
counsel's motions to withdraw and for mistrial in the instant 
case, were for reasons set forth above, clearly within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and should not be reversed unless 
clear error or abuse is shown. State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 
453 (Utah 1982); State v. Doherty, 509 P.2d 351, 352 (Utah 1973); 
People v. Ashton, 661 P.2d 291, 294 (Colo. App. 1982) 
Similarly, in Watson v. District Court In And For 
Fourth Judicial District, 604 P.2d 1165, 1168 (Colo. 1980), the 
Court held that defense counsel has a heavy duty to insure that a 
frivolous motion to withdraw is not made. The Court stated that 
"the trial court in considering [a defense counsel's] request for 
withdrawal of counsel, will be in a position to properly weigh 
the issue involved in light of the evidence presented. . . . " 
Van Cott v. Wall, 53 Utah 282, 178 P. 42 (Utah 1919). Accord, 
Comden v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 576 P.2d 971, 974 
(Cal. 1978) (when it is impractical to determine with certainty 
whether an attorney ought to testify, the trial court ordinarily 
must make a determination notwithstanding the uncertainty, as 
delay in making a decision may prejudice the client). 
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In the present case, the trial court had the 
opportunity to consider the probative value of defense counsel's 
proffered testimony and compare that value with the threat of 
possible prejudice toward the defendant should defense counsel's 
credibility be questioned. Because defense counsel's proffered 
testimony addressed only insignificant collateral matters, it was 
unnecessary in order to rebut the alleged inconsistencies of 
Detective Imig's testimony. Therefore, the trial court acted 
within the scope of its discretion in denying the Motion for New 
Trial. 
POINT X 
BECAUSE NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR OCCURRED IN THIS 
CASE, DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL 
BASED UPON "CUMULATIVE ERROR." 
Defendant requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction for attempted murder on the basis of the cumulative 
effect of the errors committed by the trial court. Based upon 
the foregoing discussion of defendant's allegations of error, 
reversal of his conviction is not warranted on the theory of 
cumulative error. Because the trial court, at most, committed 
harmless error, defendant's conviction should be affirmed. See 
State v. Rammell, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986); Hawkes v. 
State, 644 P.2d 111, 133 (Okla. Crim. 1982); State v. McKenzie, 
608 P.2d 428, 448 (Mont. 1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1050; 
United States v. Bohr, 481 F.2d 1294, 1304 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 539 U.S. 958. 
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POINT XI 
ATTEMPTED FIRST DEGREE MURDER CAN BE THE 
UNDERLYING CRIME UPON WHICH A CHARGE 
OF HABITUAL CRIMINAL CAN BE BASED. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in allowing 
the prosecution to charge defendant with being an habitual 
criminal when the underlying or "triggering" offense is attempted 
first degree murder. Defendant provides no legal support for his 
argument, aside from Solem v. Helmy 422 U.S. 277 (1983) which 
holds that a term of life imprisonment following a conviction for 
a $100 "no account" check was disproportionate in violation of 
the eighth amendment. 
The habitual criminal statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
1001 (1978) states: 
Any person who has been twice convicted, sen-
tenced and committed for felony offenses at 
least one of which offenses having been at 
least a felony of the second degree of a 
crime which, if committed within this state 
would have been a capital felony, felony of 
the first degree or felony of the second 
degree, and was committed to any prison may, 
upon conviction of at least a felony of the 
second degree committed in this state, other 
than murder in the first or second degree, be 
determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for from five 
years to life. 
The statute provides that the triggering offense cannot 
be murder in the first or second degree; the statute does not 
preclude attempted murder in the first or second degree from 
being the triggering offense. 
This Court has previously stated that the language of 
the habitual criminal statute is "clear and unambiguous." State 
v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 190 (Utah 1983). The language of the 
statute precludes the use of first or second degree murder as 
being the triggering offense; no where in the statute does the 
language suggest that the legislature intended to include an 
attempted murder within the ambit of that phrase. 
The original habitual criminal statute was enacted in 
1896; it contained language similar to the present statute: 
"Whoever has been previously twice convicted of crime . . . shall 
upon conviction of a felony committed in this state, other than 
murder in the first or second degree . . ." Utah Code Ann. 103-1-
18 (1896) (emphasis added); State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 1276, 1276 
(Utah 1978). The statute was amended in 1953 and retained the 
language that states that the triggering offense must be "other 
than murder in the first or second degree." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
1-18 (1953) (Laws of Utah, ch. 77, sec. 1); Carter, at 1276. The 
statute was repealed in 1973 and the present statute was enacted 
in 1975. The legislative history is unclear as to the reason the 
language in question, "other than murder in the first or second 
degree," was contained in the original statute; the history is 
also unclear as to why the language was maintained. 
There may have been a reason for the language in 1896; 
however, the reason, if any, no longer exists. The purpose of 
the habitual criminal statute is to subject persistent offenders 
to more severe penalties. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 207 
(Utah 1987); State v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 190 (Utah 1983). 
Because the language in question serves no purpose, and the 
purpose of the statute is to provide greater sanctions for 
persistent offenders, the statute should not be expanded to 
include an attempt to commit murder in the first or second 
degree. 
If the legislative had intended that attempted murder 
be included, it would have used that language, as it has done in 
numerous other statues. For example, in Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-
102 (Supp. 1988), the legislature provided that when a defendant 
is convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, the classification 
of the offense is one degree lower. However, when an attempt to 
commit child kidnapping, or an attempt to commit a sexual offense 
which is a first degree felony prohibited by part 4 of Chapter 5, 
the attempt to commit the crime remains a first degree felony. 
In Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-406 (Supp. 1988), the legislature 
provided that probation could not be granted for certain offenses 
and that is could not be granted for an attempt to commit some of 
4 
those offense. See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501 (1978). In 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-4-102 (Supp. 1988) states: 
"Criminal attempt to commit (1) A capital 
felony is a felony of the first degree; (2) A 
felony of the first degree is a felony of the 
second degree; except that an attempt to 
commit child kidnaping, or to commit a 
violation of Section 76-5-301.1 or to commit 
any of those felonies described in part 4 of 
Chapter 5 of this title which are felonies of 
the first degree is a felony of the first 
degree. . . .M 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-406(1) (Supp. 1988) states: 
(1) Nothwithstanding Sections 76-3-201 
and 77-18-1, and Chapter 16, Title 77, and 
any other provision of law, except as 
provided in Section 76-5-406.5, probation 
shall not be granted, the execution or 
imposition of sentence shall not be 
suspended, the court shall not enter a 
judgment for a lower category of offense, and 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1978) the legislature did not include 
the language "attempt- and therefore attempted murder does not 
fall within the exception, but rather is a "triggering" offense, 
making defendant subject to prosecution under the statute. 
Defendant's argument that he was punished more severely 
for the attempt to commit the murder of Trooper Bringhurst than 
he would have been if he had actually caused his death is without 
merit. Had defendant actually caused Bringhurst's death, he 
would have been subject to either life imprisonment or, if given 
the alternate penalty, to death for his crime. 
The clear language of the statute does not include 
"attempt" to commit murder in the first or second degree as being 
excluded from the category of triggering offenses for the offense 
of being an habitual criminal. The language should not be 
expanded to include an attempt. Therefore, defendant was 
properly charged and convicted of being an habitual criminal 
following his charge and conviction with attempted murder in the 
first degree. 
Cont. hospitalization shall not be 
ordered, the effect of which would in any way 
shorten the prison sentence for any person 
who commits a felony of the first degree 
involving: child kidnaping, a violation of 
Section 76-5-301.1; aggravated kidnaping, a 
violation of Section 76-5-302; rape, a 
violation of Section 76-5-402.1; any attempt 
to commit rape of a child; object rape of a 
child, a violation of Section 76-5-402.3; any 
attempt to commit object rape of a child; 
sodomy upon a child, a violation of Section 
76-5-403.1; aggravated sexual abuse of a 
child, a violation of Subsections 76-5-
404.1(3) and (4); or aggravated sexual 
assault, a violation of Section 76-5-405. 
POINT XII 
DEFENDANT WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL ON EACH 
PRIOR CONVICTION AND HIS PLEAS ARE, THEREFORE, 
PRESUMED VOLUNTARY. 
During defendant's trial for being an habitual 
criminal, Ralph Newberg, the records administrator for the Idaho 
Department of Corrections, testified that he was personally 
familiar with the defendant and that the records admitted as 
State's Exhibit No. 1 (certified copies of the photograph, 
fingerprint record, and commitment papers) pertained to defendant 
(R. 617-18). The documents reflected that defendant had been 
convicted of burglary in the first degree, escape, a second 
escape, and assault with a deadly weapon (which Mr. Newberg 
testified occurred during the course of the latter escape) (R. 
620-23). The documents also reflect, as conceded by defendant 
(Br. of App. at 75), that defendant was represented by counsel 
during each proceeding (See Exhibit B). 
At trial, defendant did not testify and presented no 
evidence, relying on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
all of the elements of the habitual criminal offense. 
The documents show that defendant was represented by 
counsel during the proceedings resulting in all prior 
convictions. Because defendant was represented by counsel in 
each case, and the representation was clearly made part of the 
record, the State was entitled to a presumption that defendant 
had voluntarily entered his guilty pleas. State v. Branch, 743 
P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 1987); State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 743 
(Utah 1985); Moxley v. Morris, 655 P.2d 640, 640, n. 1 (citing 
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Guqlielmetti v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 341, 496 P.2d 261 (1972) (when 
defendant is represented by counsel, this Court will deem the 
plea to be voluntary)). In Branch, the State introduced 
commitment documents which showed that the defendant had been 
represented by counsel at the time he had entered two of three 
guilty pleas upon which the State relied in proving the offense 
of being an habitual criminal. This Court stated: 
The State demonstrated that both pleas were 
entered with the benefit of counsel. There-
fore, in the absence of any evidence demon-
strating the pleas were involuntary, the pleas 
are presumed to have been voluntary (citing 
Moxley v. Morris, 655 P.2d 610, 641 (Utah 
1982)). A defendant can overcome this 
presumption by presenting to the trial court 
some evidence of involuntariness, thus 
shifting back to the State the burden of 
demonstrating voluntariness. The defendant 
is the party who can most readily demon-
strate that the pleas were involuntarily 
made if they indeed were; it therefore 
seems unreasonable to impose upon the State 
the duty of showing not only that the pleas 
were made with adequate counsel but also that 
the pleas were no involuntary. 
Id. at 1192-93. 
Defendant presented no evidence, however slight, that 
his pleas were not voluntary* Because he was represented by 
counsel during each prior proceeding resulting in convictions 
relied upon by the State, the pleas are presumed to have been 
voluntary, absent any evidence to the contrary. The judgments 
were constitutionally sufficient under both the United States and 
Utah Constitutions. Defendant's conviction for being an habitual 
criminal should be affirmed. 
Defendant's plea affidavit was admitted to show the 
voluntariness of the third plea. 
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POINT XIII 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS WERE SUFFICIENT 
TO INVOKE THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL PROVISION. 
The habitual criminal statute, Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-
1001 (1978) states: 
Any person who has been twice convicted, 
committed, sentenced, and committed for felony 
offenses at least one of which offenses having 
been a felony of the second degree or a crime, 
which, if committed within this state would 
have been a capital felony, felony of the 
first degree or felony of the second degree, 
and was committed to any prison may, upon 
conviction of at least a felony of the second 
degree committed in this state, other than 
murder in the first or second degree, be 
determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for from five 
years to life. 
(Emphasis added.) 
According to the statute, only one prior conviction 
need be at least a second degree felony. The other conviction 
used to establish the charge, can be a felony in any degree. 
Additionally, the language of the statute uses the 
disjunctive term "or" between the two phrases regarding the prior 
convictions. As a result, the first portion of the statute 
(twice convicted "for felony offenses at least one of which 
offenses having been at least a felony of the second degree") 
appears to focus upon the state in which the conviction occurred 
for the determination of the degree of the felony. The second 
portion of that phrase ("or a crime which, if committed within 
this state, would have been a capital felony, felony of the first 
degree or felony of the second degree. . .") relies upon the Utah 
law for a determination of the degree of the felony. Utah Code 
Ann. §76-8-1001 (1978) (emphasis added). 
Defendant's prior convictions were more than sufficient 
to establish the requisite number and degree of felony to 
establish foundation for the habitual criminal conviction. 
Defendant's convictions were as follows: 
1. Burglary in the first degree, a felony which 
carried a term of imprisonment of not less than one nor more than 
five years (R. 620, Exhibit 1 (See Appendix B)). 
2. Escape, a felony which carried a term of 
imprisonment not to exceed two years (R. 621, Exhibit 1 (See 
Appendix B)). Mr. Newberg stated that the escape was from the 
Idaho prison (R. 621). 
3. Escape, which carried a term of imprisonment not to 
exceed five years (R. 622, Exhibit 1 (See Appendix B)). Again, 
the escape was from a correction's department facility (R. 622). 
4. Assault with a deadly weapon, which carried a term 
of imprisonment not to exceed two years (R. 622-23, Exhibit 1 
(See Appendix B)). 
The second escape and the assault with a deadly weapon 
occurred at the time but were separate convictions. The State 
and defendant are in agreement that the assault, if committed in 
Utah, would be a third degree felony (Br. of App. at 83). 
Any one of defendant's first three convictions are 
sufficient to establish the requisite second degree felony. In 
Idaho, the burglary was a felony in the first degree. Under the 
first portion of the statute, which focuses on the convicting 
state for a determination of the degree of the felony, the 
conviction is sufficient to constitute at least a felony of the 
second degree. 
Either or both of the escapes would constitute a second 
degree felony if committed within the State of Utah. The Utah 
escape statute, Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-309 (1978) states, in 
relevant part: 
(1) A person is guilty of escape if he escapes 
from official custody. 
(2) The offense is a felony of the second 
degree if: 
(a) The actor employs force, threat, or a deadly 
weapon against any person to effect the 
escape; or 
(b) The actor escapes from confinement in the 
state prison. Otherwise, escape is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(3) . . . For purposes of this section, a 
person is deemed to be confined in the Utah 
state prison if he has been sentenced and 
committed and the sentence has not been termi-
nated or voided or the prisoner is not on parol. 
Defendant's first escape conviction arose from an escape from the 
Idaho prison. The second escape was also from a prison facility; 
additionally, he used a deadly weapon during the course of the 
escape. Therefore, under either subsection (a) or (b) of the 
escape statute, the crime would constitute a second decree 
felony. Thus, either escape charge would be sufficient to 
establish the requisite second degree felony. 
Additionally, defendant was convicted of assault with a 
deadly weapon, which would be a third degree felony if committed 
within the State of Utah. This felony, or any one of the above 
convictions which did not serve to establish the requisite second 
degree felony, could serve as the second felony to establish that 
the defendant had "been twice convicted." 
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If this Court were not to construe the first portion of 
the Utah habitual criminal statute (as set-forth above) to rely 
upon the convicting state for the determination of the degree of 
the felony, and were instead to focus solely on whether the 
burglary would have been a second degree felony if committed in 
Utah, this Court would likely find that the crime would not 
constitute a felony if committed in Utah. Defendant was 
convicted of a vehicle burglary; the crime if committed in Utah 
would be a class A misdemeanor. If this Court rejects the 
State's interpretation of the statute and the disjunctive "or" in 
the portion of the statute addressing the prior convictions, 
defendant's burglary conviction could not be used as one of the 
prior felony convictions providing foundation for the habitual 
criminal charge. 
Nevertheless, even if the burglary were totally 
disregarded, the evidence is still more than sufficient to 
establish the requisite offenses. Either escape would constitute 
the second degree felony; the other escape or the assault with a 
deadly weapon would suffice to establish the other felony 
conviction required. 
Defendant's argument that this Court should look beyond 
the escape convictions and focus on why defendant was 
incarcerated in the prison in the first place is without merit. 
Defendant was committed for a first degree felony burglary under 
Idaho law. This Court should not second guess whether the facts 
of defendant's crime and the facts known to the judge at the time 
of sentencing were sufficiently egregious as to justify 
imprisonment. Defendant admits that he escaped from the Idaho 
prison and an adjacent prison facility (Br. of App. at 85). 
There can be no doubt that his prior convictions were sufficient 
to justify the invocation of Utah's habitual criminal provision. 
Defendant's argument that he is not the type of 
offender for which the habitual criminal statute was enacted is 
equally without merit. The record reflects that the four Idaho 
convictions which the State used for the habitual criminal charge 
were not his only prior convictions (R. 1524). Regardless, even 
the prior convictions used to establish the habitual criminal 
conviction show that defendant is precisely the type of offender 
for whom the habitual criminal statute was enacted. 
The trial court did not err in finding that defendant 
had previously been convicted on two occasions for felony 
offenses, one of which was at least a felony of the second 
degree. His conviction for being an habitual criminal should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant, Danny Lee Johnson, received a fair trial and 
was properly convicted of attempted criminal homicide—murder in 
the first degree of being an habitual criminal. For the 
Reference was made to defendant's prior convictions during the 
hearing on whether to allow all prior convictions for impeachment 
purposes (R. 1524). Additional information was given the trial 
court at the time of sentencing (R. 596-97). 
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lony week* III I I )uirt Ihnive tin a«i \ uu aqai i i were air, il 
you exposed to any media , p i i n l , tv l a v i s n n o r c o n v e r s a t i . 
Willi anyone r e g a r d i n g t h i s c a s e over t h e weekend;1 Ii s o , 
I il II II II i|„ Il  I i II I i II I ' 1 1 1 1 S I \ III II II II II II Il . 
The recoxd may show no one has raised his or 
her hand. 
1 
10 I a r e p r e s e n t h e r e and r e a d y t o p i n t ' t e d , i s t h a i c o r r e c t ? 
Ii MJ- I I I " I I I Mill I mil in " I b e l i e v e we put i l l t he 
1 1 ) i a mi I  I t > mi II II in I in i i i i in i II II mi II H i i i l u i i ii 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 n « . n n I , I , u < in II in i i i i I I t | 
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11:5 iJinI UuiLiij Juhnsoii fui the de l endan t Hi "re p r e p a r e d a t 
11 ' i  in I I 11 1 I 11 va 1 J t o t h e s t a n d 1.t , Han Fa i J111 
1 j Till f i iM<T: Al l i nil i 
ill! ' 
I DIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 0 iVi f
"
llj
' I'ALALlUb, 
21 • QL l«t„ F a l l o w s , you have horn sworn; i s t h a t c o r r e c t ] 
2 31!! II Yes , ma 'am 
2 2 1 > ( ill 
2 1 3 foi ir c>ccupation 
25 k Dan L. Fallows, * cua a lieutenant wxun m e 
4 99 
Utah Highway P a t r o l 
ft Wi 1 i | (in 
K 1 
ft Dc you know Trooper Bringhurst? 
K I Il 
ft A n d Hi ici " ^ _)u k n o w h i m ? 
K Through working relationships and developed 
fr 
ft Over what period of years? 
10 I A, r roximate.1 y " } \ nn 
I in ft J i 11 o a p e r ti u 11 a I t 1 1 v 11d 
12 * 
13 ft Did i < occasion f« < isit. Trooper Branqhurstl 
I | in the hospital in Ma^ oL 19H li 
15 A. I d u l 
16 I ' f t A J Ki i M I I ] i i u l i 11 I I ' « 'I I 
1 Il 
1 8 I! A . Dennis was a d m i t t e d t o t lie h o s p i t a l from i n j u r i e s 
1 9 in mi l ii i 11 in i in ill III in in in in in in in in i III Ill 1 1 III i ( mi i 
20 & in i i i i us 11 as a I r l e n d 
, /' • . ' k 
22 ft io i 
23 y »u t\l least wen- J, ^ ; .spitai? 
2 1 K Three, 
25 : ' ft And t h e f u s t , I h ^ J t i i t . 1 wn I I III I i i ' . t . 
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'I 
The first visit was on the 27th. 
I fr , P a 1 1 n « i ID i 11 f el. r i i ! i i i i in ( 1 I i < i i 
" , ,, mi mi mi II 
*"• r lfci 
- J J ,'>."< t i e . - u s e 1 i> I ! • !,< , ' i •, w h . i t 1 h e y 
are . 
I i »i» 1 e * i i my f I I r i T I i iii i I , I ) | 
w h i . n „x.o l e corded a c t i v i t i e s of my •, • • < ' e c o r d of 
iii'i in t i v i t i e s f o r g iven d a t e s ana 1 Have Xeroxed t h e d a t e s 
> | < i » " s i i " i I i ' ' M t H ' I I I I i i I " l | Ii i f INI I , I I h i 
Q. And were the notes- i those logs made on the 
same d£u », - h ^ c o ^ *>,*<-. A^r>+~< -*,- + , r r e d ? 
*• * '
nrrQ
 *.*
 h iy pulled, 
them -*~i Xr-r •* refresh my memory : dates and 
my activities for those dates. 
ft '-"^ 'i lu I. I'| I hat yon visited him, 
what was he doing? 
K " i 1 in i n in mi I I I II in i in II 1 1 1 mi i i 
ft becund Lime yen v i s i t e d him, whet I, 
t h a t ? • 
K T h a i TI " i " • - i ', ' v " in I | I I
 m i j i i , i. | N i I 
ft . i l iul wuh he- d u i n q cii i h a t i i n i e 
K He was u p m o v i n g a b o u t , t a l k i n g 
ft ^ r' i ' i " I i i i mi mi III r e s p e c t 
l.i'ii 1 I  lie i n c i d e n t at, ' i" >i • 
K No, I did not. 
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Qi Y o u r visit at that, lime was as a friend? 
J""'t Yes. 
Qi, kou went back PI il 1 I I I IJ I imp,, W h a t d a y w a s that? 
J! That, was ui'i Thursdcj r the 29th of Ma> , 
Q I " ) ) i ( i n mi mi i mi 1 1 i i i i l i in mi mi mi I I I I I I in I I I I in ml iioi i ( > 
I A p p i u x una tely 9iJ 0 . 
Q In t he m o r n i n g ? 
J ' 
0 And who went w i t h you? 
I I was a 1 o n e . 
C ) ' ( ( II in I in I I in IIIIII Ill in II i(, i m i mi i n l i in i mi i 1 1 II 1 , 1 1 in 
Trooper Bringhurst leqarding thf incidents ul this < -. 
j ' Yes I il Il 
(), , ' " ' i vv i e w as par t o! an internal 
neview process? 
II Yes. 
" II' was n o t »? pa^*- ^^ ^ ~rirr.ir.al i n v e s t i g a t i o n ; 
i s I.ha o r r e c t ? 
Tl ' r i l * i i n i l . 
20 i CI U id yuu kiinw w h e t h e r o r no t your i n t e r v i e w 
21 wi b e u s e d a s p a r t o t a c r i m i n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n ? 
2 2 J 1 11 1 11 II 11 Ill II I III I III 1 > III III l< ml ;,„ «. 11 III I l l 
22 t "t i t tl it il mi in I mi nil ul I hi i n t e r v i ew « i i s din i n t e r n a l r e v i e w 
24 p r o c e s s l o r our depar t-mpnt» 
2 '' Q i Kill 1 1 i 11'IIII i ' I I I I ave 
SO/"1 
any concerns regarding his condition? 
A. I had some concerns regarding his condition. 
There was obviously some pain, the bandages, so on. 
Q That's my question. What specifically were 
your concerns? 
A. Just his general condition, physical and mental. 
Q You said he was in a lot of pain? 
K He appeared to be. 
QL And what was his demeanor when you questioned 
10 I him regarding the events? 
11 J A. Well, his demeanor changed periodically throughout 
the questioning, but I would describe it as somewhat active 
and hyper, wanting to tell his story. 
QL Was he also excitable? 
K Yes. 
Qi And was this one of the reasons that you were 
concerned about talking to him? 
k Yes. 
0 Did you believe that he understood or were 
20 I you able to perceive whether or not he understood your 
21 questions? 
22 K There were some that I don't think he understood 
2J precisely, but for the most part, yes. 
24 0 Did you have any problem understanding what 
25 he was saying? 
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1 A. No. 
2 ft And you made a determination at that time then 
3 to ask him questions and interview him? 
4 I k Yes. 
5 Qi You began the interview at 9:30? 
6 A. That fs approximately when it started. 
7 ft And where were you? 
I I A. We were at LDS Hospital in his room. I would 
9 have to guess. I believe it was the fifth floor. I don't 
10 recall the room number actually. 
H QL Was he in intensive care unit? 
12 A. No. I believe it was, I think they call it — 
13 it's not intensive care but it's a close-watch type of 
14 ward where there are more nurses than a normal ward. 
15 Qi So the next step down from ICU before regular 
16 patient care? 
17 A. As I understand that particular ward. 
18 ft Who was present? 
19 A. Trooper Bringhurst's wife and I believe one 
20 of his children. 
21 ft Was anyone else present? 
22 A. Many people came and went throughout the intervie(w 
23 but as far as anyone being there or participating, no. 
24 ft And how long were you present approximately? 
25 A. With Dennis that day or for the actual — 
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Qi That morning for the interview. 
K In the interview, two, two and a half hours. 
ft And how long — well, let me ask you this. 
Did you tape the interview? 
K Yes, I did. 
Qi And approximately how long is that tape? 
K Approximately 90 minutes. 
Qi Did you stay and have lunch that day with 
Trooper Bringhurst? 
10 I A. No. I left and had lunch with Trooper Bringhurst] 
11 Qi You did have lunch with Trooper Bringhurst? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 ft And that was not in the hospital on that day? 
14 K No. 
15 ft There are portions — have you had an opportunity 
16 to review the tape? 
17 A. No, I have not. I have had an opportunity 
IS to review the — 
19 ft — transcript. 
20 K — the transcript of the tape. 
21 ft Okay. And in that, let me ask you this. Is 
22 that transcript a true and accurate reflection of your 
23 conversation with Trooper Bringhurst as you recall it? 
24 K As I recall the conversation of the interview, 
2$ yes. I have not had an opportunity to listen to the tape 
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and read verbatim as it was transcribed. 
Qt But you have reviewed the tape. As far as you 
know, is it accurate? 
K Yes. 
QL And in fact, the — who taped the tape? 
A. Secretary to Commissioner Badraro, Holly Eales. 
QL And she's a highly reliable and trusted typist; 
is that not true? 
k Yes. 
ft During the course of the transcription there 
are points which indicate that the type is turned off; 
is that right? 
k Yes. 
QL Would you please tell the jury, as far as you 
recall, what those reasons were for turning the tape off? 
A. There were times when I felt it necessary to 
give Trooper Bringhurst a rest. There were interruptions 
from visitors, people coming into the room, which I didn't 
feel like they should participate or be present. Those 
are basically the reasons. 
ft Were there any medical personnel? 
k I believe there was a nurse, and I even recall 
a doctor, I think, came in but that is not positive. 
ft Okay. So the tape was — when the tape was 
turned off, it was not — there is no other conversation 
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that you had regarding this incident that is not on the 
tape? 
A. No. The ~ there was no conversation pursuant 
to the incident that was not on the tape recorder. 
ft During the interview what — we know what the 
purpose is for, but what are you trying to do when you 
ask him certain questions? Are you trying to get the detail^ 
A. I am trying to get details, yes. 
ft Now, I asked you to review the transcript and 
10 I directed you to certain parts; is that right? 
11 I A. Yes. 
ft And we went over those parts, those pertinent 
parts, yesterday in the County Attorney's Office; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
ft With the county attorney present. 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
ft I am going to direct your attention first of 
all to page 7. I am going to direct you down three-quarters 
20 I of the page, I believe you and the prosecutor have those 
21 parts marked, and ask you if you asked the question to 
22 Trooper Bringhurst, okay, to what would you estimate his 
23 speed? Did you ask him that question? 
24 K Yes. 
25 ft And was his answer basically that making the 
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2 5 
left turn and going up Third West never over five miles 
an hour? 
A. Yes. 
ft I am going to direct your attention to page 
1 of the transcript. Let me ask you this before we go over 
there. On the five miles an hour, he's describing the 
Third West proper, am I correct? Third West road when 
he's talking about speed? 
k No. We're describing the general area. Are 
you indicating there, his statement there? 
ft No. I am indicating his answer. Making the 
left turn and going up Third West never over five miles 
per hour. 
A. We're describing the overall area of the 
intersection of 13th and Third West. 
ft But he said going up Third West; is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
ft I am sorry. Now back to page 1. On that page 
I directed you to a portion. Have you had a chance to review 
that portion? 
K Yes, ma'am. 
ft And as far as this portion where he's talking, 
was that in response to a question that you asked? 
K N o . 
ft He at this point then is just relating his story? 
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1 K Yes. 
2 ft And this is at the beginning of the interview; 
3 is that right? 
4 K Yes. 
5 & Did he, in his story, ask you or say, the subject} 
6 looked at the officer and then without checking traffic 
7 or anything, just made the turn? 
t I K I started up to where we highlighted. I am 
9 trying to get down to the portion. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. Seventh line down? 
12 ft Yes. 
U K Would you repeat? 
14 ft Yes. Did he say — 
15 MS. KNIGHT-EGAN: Your Honor, I will object 
16 to the leading form of the questions. 
17 MS. PALACIOS: Your Honor, in order for me 
18 to direct him to the pertinent parts that are at issue 
19 here, I have to lead him. Itfs a preliminary question 
20 which I believe is admissible. 
21 THE COURT: Is that numbered or is it not numbered? 
22 MS. PALACIOS: It's my numbering. 
21 THE COURT: I mean the transcript — oh, it's 
24 not numbered by line. 
2$ MS. KNIGHT-EGAN: Your Honor, the page numbers 
are numbered on the transcript. 
THE COURT: The lines are not numbered though. 
MS. KNIGHT-EGAN: The lines are not numbered. 
THE COURT: She may have to lead to get him 
to the right question. 
MS. PALACIOS: Thank you, your Honor. 
ft I am going to ask you, did he say "at you," 
the subject looked at you, the officer, and then at you 
without checking traffic or anything, just made the turn? 
K Yes. 
ft Now, he's describing being at what point when 
this happens? Where is he? 
A. Okay. That particular question I need to read 
above that to make a determination of what exactly, because 
I can't mix the sentences up. If you will bear with me, 
I will read it then I can answer your question. 
ft Okay. 
A. Okay. That particular question would be in 
regards to the 13th South offramp from the Interstate 15 
collector system. 
20 I ft Okay. Thank you. Page 10. Begin about three-
21 fourths down where I marked it for you. Did you ask him 
22 what position are your beams in on your car, headlights? 
21 K Yes. 
24 ft And did he answer, I think low beam, I am not 
25 sure? 
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A. 
& 
did you 
saw"? 
A. 
saw." 
ft 
K 
a 
K 
a 
K 
was goin 
a 
K 
Yes. 
Page 21. Again, to that portion of the testimony 
ask him, "Now, what relate the police officer you 
"Now, what relate the police officer that you 
That you saw? 
Yes. 
And what were you asking him there? 
May I again refer? 
Yes, if you need to review. 
Okay. That was a situation as the police officer 
g by in pursuit. 
The police officer, meaning Evans? 
I don't know which police officer. A Salt 
Lake City police officer. 
a 
officer 
K 
And you were asking him where he was when the 
went by? 
I was asking him as I am referring back up 
to the top of the page, wanting to know where he was and 
what he 
& 
where he 
K 
0 
was doing. Where had he gotten to at that point. 
And what was his answer when you asked him 
was when the officer was in pursuit? 
His car. 
His answer was that he was in his car? 
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A. That was the impression I had of his answer. 
I am going to have to read to give you the exact response. 
0 Okay. What was his exact response? Again, 
I am referring to that portion on page 21. 
A> Okay. You're asking me to read the statement 
that he made to me? 
Q, Yes. Where he asked him, "Now, what relate 
the police officer that you saw/1 what was his statement? 
K "He went past as the car was speeding away. 
10 I I don't recall if I was in my car — yes, I think I was 
11 sitting in my car. I don't remember.w 
12 & Thank you. Page 8. The bottom of the page. 
13 Did you ask him: "Try to recollect what was going through 
14 your mind"? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 & And was his answer "Nothing. If anything, 
17 I was probably cocky, I was sure I had a drunk"? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 & Page 9: Do you recall asking him whether or 
20 not he used his flashlight into the rear view mirror of 
21 Mr. Johnson's vehicle ? 
22 K I don't recall asking him that specific question,] 
21 did he use his flashlight in the mirror. 
24 Q Do you recall him giving you information regarding 
25 that? 
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K Yes. 
QL And what did he tell you as to whether or not 
his flashlight hit onto the rear view mirror? 
A. Are you asking me to read the statement that 
he gave at the bottom? 
QL YOU can read the statement or if you recall, 
you an answer. 
A. Yes. I would prefer to just read his statement. 
"No," and he didn't. I wasn't watching his eyes to see 
any more because I had already had eye contact with him 
and I wasn't watching his eyes any more in the mirror to 
see if he was watching me keeping contact on me, but I 
did hit him — hit his mirror with my flashlight." 
QL So he did say "but I did hit his mirror with 
my flashlight"? 
k Yes. 
QL And then on page 15 again with respect to the 
flashlight. Did he ever at any point tell you that in 
fact he did not use his flashlight? 
20 J A. Not that — not as I recall. 
21 Q. I am going to direct you to the portion — 
22 let me count it. Nine and ask you to read that and see 
23 if that refreshes your recollection. 
24 K Now, this is my statement or Trooper Bringhurst' 
2$ QL Bringhurst'S statement. 
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A. "I think it was in my right hand at this time. 
Probably changed over when I closed the car door. Walked 
up like this and hit him in the face right there and didn't 
have it. As a matter of fact, the street was so light 
and everything, I didn't even have my flashlight in his 
car." 
Qi Okay. As far as you could tell, was he able 
to actually tell you for sure whether or not he was using 
the flashlight? 
10 I k I don't understand your question. 
11 I Qt Was he — what was your impression in this 
answer? Was it that he in fact used the flashlight or 
that he did not use the flashlight? 
A* My impression was that he was concerned over 
the possibility of remembering if he had his flashlight 
and in which hand he had it in. He had his flashlight 
with him but it was the hand he was concerned with. That 
was my impression, which hand he was using. 
Qi But was it ever clear to you whether or not 
20 I he had it or not? 
21 A. It was never a question to me as to whether 
22 he didn't or not — didn't or didn't have it. He had it 
23 in his hand, that's as I — 
24 QL I don't mean to confuse you. My question is 
25 with respect to whether or not he actually shone the light 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
in 
to 
did 
him 
the rear view mirror, was there ever — were you able 
determine whether or not that was true or not? 
K My impression is that that was true, that he 
in fact use the flashlight in the mirror. 
a 
about 
K 
a 
A. 
beginning 
to 
him 
to 
you 
May 
a 
review 
K 
a 
Okay. Again, on that same page, did you ask 
how close he was to the vehicle? 
Yes. 
And what did you ask him? 
Well, we would have to back up to get to the 
of the actual questioning in that regard. 
Let me ask you this. Have you had a chance 
that portion? 
Yes. 
And in that portion of questions, are you asking 
how close he was to the car? 
A. 
o 
Yes. 
Does Bringhurst then say, "I wasn't any closer 
the car than I am to that," page 15? 
K 
r secre 
a 
I have it. I am trying to find out because 
itary hasn't highlighted that portion to that. 
It's just above — do you want me to show you? 
I approach him, your Honor? 
a 
K 
THE COURT: Yes, you may do so. 
(By Ms. Palacios) Did he say that? 
Yes. 
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ft And when he said that, what was he referring 
to? 
k I believe he was referring to the hospital 
bed stand which can go across the bed for serving meals 
and so on. 
ft And did you then respond to him, "Okay, you're 
standing about 18 inches away offset on about a 45-degree 
angle"? 
K Yes. 
Qi And did he respond, "Yeah, right there"? 
K Yes. 
ft And when he said, "Yeah, right there," did 
he mention or do anything else? 
A. He was indicating that that — the statement 
that I had made would be about right in relation to that 
tray. 
Qi Page 23. Directing your attention to the portiorj 
I asked you to review. Did you ask Trooper Bringhurst, 
"Was anyone attending to you at all, the city policemen?" 
K Yes. 
ft And did he answer, "No. I think at some time 
22 I I started for my trunk to get a compress because my keys 
23 were in the trunk. I think I went back there to get a 
24 compress to stop the bleeding, but I don't remember"? 
25 K Your question was did he say that? 
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a Yes. 
k Yes. 
ft Now, when you interviewed and questioned 
Trooper Bringhurst, he tried very hard to answer those 
questions; is that correct? 
k Yes. 
ft And when he could not recall, he would say 
that he could not recall; is that right? 
k He said on some occasions that something to 
10 I the effect that, "I just can't remember." 
111 ft And he was anxious to tell you what happened? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 ft And was he stressed because of the questioning 
14 itself? 
15 k Yes. 
16 I MS. PALACIOS: That's all I have. 
17 
1* I CROSS-EXAMINATION 
19 BY MS. KNIGHT-EGAN: 
20 ft Lt. Fallows, you have described somewhat of 
21 Trooper Bringhurst1s condition as you met with him in the 
22 hospital on the 28th; is that correct? 
23 I k Yes. 
24 ft What did you see about him that led you to 
25 believe he was in pain? 
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APPENDIX B 
.5U Rev. Statutes, Sec. 906: Attestation by Legal Keeper of Records with Certificate 
eal attached) of Secretary of State of official capacity of said Legal Keeper.) 
ATE OF IDAHO ) 
UNTY OF ADA ) 
I, Ralph D. Newberg, do hereby certify: That I am the Records Administrator for the 
aho State Correctional Institution, situated in the county and state aforesaid; that ir 
legal custody as such officer are the original files and records of persons heretofore 
emitted to said penal institution; that the: 
—
( 1 ) photograph JJ (2) fingerprint record jg (3) commitment 
_J4) parole agreement (5) report of violation (6) warrant of arrest 
tached hereto are copies of the original records of H A V W TTF .TOHKSOV y / n . m t 
person heretofore committed to said penal institution and who served a term of imprisor-
it therein; that I have compared the foregoing and attached copies with their respective 
iginais now on file in my office and each thereof contains, and is a full, true and 
•rect transcript and copy from its said original. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 30th d$y of May , 
>., 19 86 . 
// <*S/V(A'<'$ 
Ralph Dnfev/berg 
Records Administrator 
IDAHO STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION RECORD 
PHOTOGRAPH FINGERPRINT RECORD COMMITMENT 
( 1) (2 ) (3 > 
TE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
NTY OF ADA ) 
I, Pete T. Cenarrusa, Secretary of State of Idaho, do hereby certify that Ralph D. 
berg, whose name is subscribed to the above certificate, was at the date thereof, ar.d is 
, the Records Administrator and is the Legal Keeper and the officer having the legal 
tody of the original records of said Idaho State Correctional Institution; that the said 
:ificate is in due form; and that the signature subscribed thereon is his genuine 
lature. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto subscribed my jwae.and affixed the Seal of the 
:e of IdahfiAtjijs w h day of Ma- • ff^^-Tt 86 . 
Pete T. Cenarrusa 
Secretary of State of Idaho 
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